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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of the study is to measure the wealth effects surrounding share repurchase 
announcements and initial actual share repurchases. As the first research question state, I 
examine whether the events have increased shareholder value and how the returns have 
differed from each other. Also key drivers behind the observed returns are analyzed and 
compared to the findings of previous literature. Finally, liquidity effects are evaluated 
surrounding the same events. Since liquidity effects around the above-mentioned events 
have not been studied earlier with Finnish data, I investigate whether companies have been 
able to increase liquidity on the Helsinki Stock Exchange through the announcements as 
stated in the second research question. 
 
DATA 
The study focuses on all listed Finnish companies trading on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
between 1998 – 2008. The announcements of share repurchase programs and initial actual 
repurchases are collected from Kauppalehti online and NASDAQ OMX database for 
corporate press releases. The final dataset includes 466 repurchase program 
announcements from 93 companies and 133 initial repurchases from 58 companies. Share 
information as well as accounting data is gathered from Thomson ONE Banker and 
information about foreign ownership from Euroclear Finland Oy.  
 
RESULTS 
The main findings of this study are that companies increase, on average, shareholder 
wealth around an announcement of a share repurchase program and around an initial actual 
repurchase and that small firms generate higher abnormal returns than large firms. The 
study also finds that signaling and free cash flow hypothesis have some power on 
explaining the observed cumulative abnormal returns. Finally, it is shown that the 
discussed events increase liquidity and trading volume in the Finnish stock market between 
1998 – 2008. 
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TUTKIMUKSEN TAVOITE 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on tarkastella varallisuusvaikutuksia omien osakkeiden 
takaisinostovaltuutuksien sekä ensimmäisten takaisinostojen yhteydessä. Ensimmäisenä 
tutkimuskysymyksenä tutkin, ovatko edellä mainitut ilmoitukset kasvattaneet 
osakkeenomistajien varallisuutta sekä miten tuotot eroavat tapahtumien välillä. 
Tutkimuksessa pyritään myös löytämään tukea aikaisemmassa kirjallisuudessa käytetyille 
hypoteeseille, joiden uskotaan selittävän havaittuja epänormaaleja tuottoja. 
Varallisuusvaikutuksien lisäksi myös likviditeettivaikutuksia on arvioitu samojen 
tapahtumien yhteydessä, koska aihetta ei ole tutkittu aiemmin suomalaisella aineistolla. 
Toisen tutkimuskysymyksen mukaan pyrin selvittämään, pystyvätkö yritykset 
vaikuttamaan likviditeettiin ilmoittamalla edellä mainituista tapahtumista. 
 
AINEISTO 
Tutkimus perustuu vaihtodataan kaikista suomalaisista yrityksistä, jotka ovat olleet 
julkisen kaupankäynnin kohteena Helsingin pörssissä vuosina 1998 – 2008. Ilmoitukset 
takaisinostovaltuutuksista sekä ensimmäisistä takaisinostoista on kerätty Kauppalehden 
sekä NASDAQ OMX:n pörssitiedotearkistoista. Lopullinen aineisto koostuu 93 yrityksen 
466 takaisinostovaltuutuksesta sekä 58 yrityksen 133 ensimmäisestä takaisinostosta. 
Osakkeisiin liittyvä informaatio ja tilinpäätösinformaatio on kerätty Thomson ONE Banker 
-tietokannasta sekä ulkomaalaisomistusosuudet Euroclear Finland Oy:n palvelusta. 
 
TULOKSET 
Tutkimuksen empiirinen osa osoittaa, että yritykset luovat keskimäärin arvoa omistajilleen 
takaisinostovaltuutuksen ilmoituksen sekä ensimmäisen takaisinoston ilmoituksen 
yhteydessä. Lisäksi arvonluonti on voimakkaampaa pienten yritysten kohdalla verrattuna 
suurempiin yrityksiin. Epänormaalien tuottojen keskeisimpiä ajureita näyttävät olevan 
signalointihypoteesi sekä vapaan kassavirran hypoteesi. Tutkimus osoittaa myös, että 
likviditeetti ja osakkeiden vaihto kasvavat edellä mainittujen tapahtumien yhteydessä.     
 
AVAINSANAT 
Omien osakkeiden takaisinostovaltuutus, ensimmäinen takaisinosto, likviditeetti, 
osakkeiden vaihto, osto- ja myyntihinnan ero  
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“When companies with outstanding businesses and comfortable financial positions find their 
shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative action can benefit 
shareholders as surely as repurchases.” – Warren Buffet, 1984 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation of the Study 
Companies are expected to use business resources efficiently and profitably. If these 
requirements are not fulfilled, the excess cash should be distributed to company’s 
shareholders. Distribution of excess cash can be carried out in different ways, but the most 
common way is to pay dividend on company’s shares. Other main alternative is share 
repurchases, the importance of which when distributing cash flows have increased 
substantially during the past 10 years.  
This thesis concentrates on share repurchase program announcements and initial actual open-
market share repurchases. Share repurchases were made possible in Finland in November 
1997 but were still restricted quite heavily until 2005 when the new amendment doubled the 
amount of shares to be repurchased. The new legislation has increased interest in the subject 
as a whole in Finland. 
Many international and a couple of studies in Finland have found abnormal returns at the 
announcement of a share repurchase program. The number of companies announcing their 
intention to start a share repurchase program has increased steadily. Abnormal returns have 
been material even though an announcement of open-market share repurchase program is not 
a commitment to execute the actual share repurchases. Actually, many companies never use 
their authorization and do not repurchase a single share. 
Even though share repurchases are a more and more common way of distributing cash to 
share holders, only a few studies have been conducted about the issue in Finland. This thesis 
follows the logic applied in a study conducted by Karhunen (2002). The study made by 
Karhunen discusses the topic extensively and from different perspectives but the small sample 
size and relatively short time period limit the reliability of the empirical results of the study.  
In addition to Karhunen’s doctoral thesis, Örmä (2008), in her master’s thesis, has tried to 
apply Karhunen’s methods to study open market repurchases. Örmä’s study discusses the 
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topic only relatively narrowly and e.g. the announcement period retuns around actual 
repurchases are completely left out. Moreover, her time period 2003 – 2006 is relatively short 
even though the data would have been available from 1998 onwards. Finally, the 
announcement dates in the thesis do not follow a consistent pattern, because some of the 
events occur when the announcement was initally made public and other events when the 
authorization was received although the information was already available and released 
earlier. 
In this thesis, I will examine the announcement effects of open-market share repurchase 
programs and the effects of the first actual share repurchases in Finland from year 1998 to 
2008. In addition to the above-mentioned research problem, I will also study the liquidity 
effects surrounding the same events. My sample is larger in terms of events and years 
compared to earlier studies. I will study whether the market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements between 1998 – 2008 are in line with previous studies internationally and in 
Finland. I also study how the market reactions have changed during the period under review 
and which factors could explain the abnormal returns. 
The motivation of the study is that there is a lack of credible research on the wealth and 
liquidity effects regarding share repurchase programs in the Finnish stock market. At the time 
of the previous benchmark study made by Karhunen (2002), share repurchases were a new 
way to distribute cash to shareholders. The effect is expected to be substantially smaller with 
the new data, since repurchases have become more common. To the best of my knowledge, 
the liquidity effects have not yet studied with Finnish data. A strength of my study is also the 
long time scale 1998 – 2008 which includes various different economic cycles.  
The study has also some limitations. In particular, the Finnish Stock Market is relatively small 
and illiquid. Even though the sample size in this study is substantially larger compared to 
Karhunen (2002), the number of observations is still much smaller compared to some 
international studies. When studying the wealth effects surrounding initial actual repurchases, 
the sample diminishes materially. 
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1.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research question of this study is twofold. First, it is examined whether the 
announcements of share repurchase programs and the initial actual share repurchases have 
increased the shareholder value in the Finnish stock market during 1998 – 2008. In addition, 
the key determinants behind the observed returns are investigated. The second research 
question in this study examines whether the share repurchase program announcements and 
initial actual repurchases have increased the liquidity or trading volume in the Finnish stock 
market. The hypotheses I try to find support for are listed below. 
H1:  An announcement of a share repurchase program has increased shareholder 
value in the Finnish stock market during 1998 – 2008. 
H1: An initial actual share repurchase has increased shareholder value in the Finnish 
stock market during 1998 – 2008. 
H3: An announcement of a share repurchase program does not have an effect on 
liquidity / trading volume in the Finnish stock market during 1998 – 2008. 
H4: An initial actual share repurchase does not have an effect on liquidity / trading 
volume in the Finnish stock market during 1998 – 2008. 
 
1.3 Contribution to Literature 
As mentioned earlier, only some studies about share repurchases have been conducted with a 
Finnish dataset and the time scale in these studies has been relatively short compared to 
international studies. This study measures the wealth effects around share repurchase events 
during the whole period when repurchases have been possible in Finland. In addition to 
wealth effects, this study contributes to the literature by increasing our understanding about 
liquidity effects surrounding the repurchase events. In general, liquidity effects have been 
studied relatively little and this study will find out the relation between share repurchases and 
some selected liquidity indicators such as trading volume, turnover and bid-ask spreads 
around repurchases. Managerial timing ability of actual share repurchases is also studied for 
the first time in Finnish markets.  
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1.4 Structure of the Study 
This study proceeds as follows. The second chapter discusses the framework of share 
repurchases in Finland, since it is probable that the empirical results are not fully comparable 
to those acquired from other countries.  
The third chapter goes through the literature and key theories as well as the previous evidence 
on the market reaction to share repurchase announcements and on the initial actual share 
repurchases. The third chapter also reviews the finance literature, which is related to the 
studied issue and which tries to explain the reasons behind the observed market reaction. 
The fourth chapter describes the data and methodology used in this study whereas the fifth 
chapter develops and presents the hypotheses.  
The sixth chapter is a central part in this study, since it reports the empirical findings of the 
event study and regressions. Sixth chapter also reports the analysis of liquidity effects under 
the same circumstances.  
Finally, the seventh chapter summarizes and concludes the study.  
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2 BACKGROUND OF SHARE REPURCHASES IN FINLAND 
Share repurchases and, in particular, open market share repurchases are an increasingly 
important corporate activity. Share repurchases have become an everyday event in the 
financial markets also in Finland, even though it is a relatively new way to distribute cash to 
shareholders. An important factor that affects companies’ payout policy is the regulatory 
environment in which the company operates. In Finland, companies who repurchase their own 
shares are controlled both by the legislation and by the rules and regulations of the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange.  
 
2.1 Share Repurchase Methods 
Share repurchases may be carried out in four different ways. The methods are open-market 
share repurchase programs, Dutch auctions, fixed-price tender offers and privatively 
negotiated purchases. Basically all share repurchases in Finland are conducted as open-market 
share repurchase programs. Tender offers have not been used for repurchases due to the 
restrictions of the number of shares that can be acquired (Karhunen, 2002). Even the new 
amendment to the Companies Act has not increased the popularity of tender offers. This 
thesis focuses on open-market share repurchases and the method is thus presented more 
rigorously than other methods. 
Open-market share repurchases are by far the most widely used and also the easiest method 
due to the fact that companies simply purchase their own shares in the open market as any 
other investors. In an open-market repurchase program, companies gradually buy back their 
shares in much smaller proportions compared to other methods. Brav et al. (2005) suggest 
that, although open-market repurchases have legal restrictions, this method offers the greatest 
degree of flexibility as it is not a commitment to buy any shares. Many managers favor 
repurchases compared to dividends because they can be used in an attempt to time the equity 
market or to increase EPS. According to the study made in Finland by Karhunen (2002), only 
50% of companies that announced a share repurchase program also used the right for actual 
repurchases.  
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There are two different tender offer methods to buy back own shares: fixed-price tender offer 
and Dutch auction. In a fixed-priced tender offer, the company offers to repurchase a 
predetermined number of shares at a fixed price during a certain period of time. The price 
often has a significant premium to the market and companies generally tender for a fairly 
large percentage of shares outstanding. The generous premium for the shareholders increases 
the probability that they will accept the offer. Fixed-price tender offers, especially those 
financed by debt tend to be very powerful and convey a positive signal to the market. 
In a Dutch auction, management defines the number of shares to be repurchased at some 
given price range (generally a premium to the market) and the expiration date. Shareholder 
may then tender their shares at any price within the price range. The pricing method removes 
the risk that a company would pay more than the price that shareholders are willing to sell. 
Starting at the bottom of the price range, the company sums the number of shares necessary to 
fulfill the program and all shareholders who tendered at or below the clearing price receive 
the clearing price for their shares. Dutch auctions usually convey strong signals to the market 
and management is able to execute them efficiently.  
In privately negotiated repurchases, the company makes a deal with a single usually 
significant shareholder or a group of shareholders. As an example can be some investor or an 
investor group who has a large amount of company’s shares in order to achieve the majority 
of company’s shares and hereby the control of the company. In a case of this nature, a 
company can offer to buy the significant number of shares from an investor or a group who 
tries to make a takeover and thus get rid of the takeover attempt. This so called greenmail 
transaction has to be made deliberately and with an extremely fair price so that the target will 
sell its shares. This type of buyback remains relatively rare. 
 
2.2 Regulatory Environment 
2.2.1 Legislation related to share repurchases 
The legislation on share repurchases is relatively new in Finland, since repurchases were not 
made possible until 1997. The initial law regarding share repurchases restricted companies to 
repurchase only 5% of the outstanding shares because legislators wanted to prevent the 
7 
 
manipulation of share prices on the thinly traded Helsinki Stock Exchange. The renewal of 
the Companies Act in 2005, which brought the legislation in Finland closer to EU standards, 
allowed companies to buy back 10 % of their outstanding shares. If the holding of own shares 
is less than the maximum 10%, the company can have them infinitely. Shares acquired in 
violation of the Companies Act must be transferred without undue delay, and in any event no 
later than one year after the acquisition. In some special occasions, the shares that exceed one 
tenth of all shares must be transferred within three years of acquisition.   
Before the company can start the repurchase program and actual repurchases, it needs to get 
an authorization. The authorization to repurchase shares can be received either by the General 
Meeting or by the board’s proposal to shareholders who accept it in the General Meeting. The 
board is required to present the proposal with all the details about the program, including the 
reason for the program and the maximum number of shares to be repurchased. The board’s 
proposal for share repurchases must be announced publicly and in most cases it is done 
together with the board’s other proposals for General Meeting. The decision to acquire own 
shares should contain, for example, the following information1:  
(1) The quantity or maximum quantity of shares that the decision concerns, broken down 
by share class. 
(2) The persons from whom the shares are to be acquired and, if necessary, the order in 
which the acquisition is to take place. 
(3) The period during which the shares are to be acquired. 
(4) The consideration to be paid for the shares. 
(5) The effects of the procedure on the equity of the company. 
 
The General Meeting makes the decision on repurchases and in a public company, the 
decision must be made by qualified majority, which means that a proposal must be supported 
by at least two thirds (⅔) of the votes cast and the shares represented at the meeting. The 
General Meeting may also authorize the Board of Directors to decide on repurchases in full or 
in part. In the new Companies Act the authorization may remain in effect for 18 months, and 
during this time the Board can use the authorization to buy back shares whenever it wants. In 
                                                 
1
 Limited Liability Companies Act, Unofficial Translation – Ministry of Justice, 2007 
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the previous Companies Act the authorization was valid for 12 months. One week before the 
actual repurchases start, the buying company must make a public announcement for using the 
shareholders’ authorization. The public announcement before starting the acquisitions is made 
to prevent company to repurchase shares from only some shareholders. Own shares may be 
acquired according to the authorization only by using unrestricted equity for the purpose. 
Share acquisitions must be made in a way that they do not affect the share price materially 
and thus the company can acquire only a certain amount of shares per day.  
In addition to Companies Act, OMX has its own rules and guidelines regarding share 
repurchases. When a company is acquiring its own shares it must operate in the market in the 
same way as other investors. A company may acquire at most a 10% share of its own shares 
and thus the company may momentarily be a significant player in the markets. The 
acquisition of own shares must be done in a way that no exceptional market movements result 
from the trading of the company and the equal treatment of the shareholders is taken into 
consideration in the acquisition as a whole. The maximum amount a company can acquire at 
each trading day is restricted to half of the average daily trading volume in four weeks 
preceding the actual repurchase. This higher percentage compared to many other countries, 
where the limit is 25%, is explained by the illiquidity and small size of the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. 
Acquisition of own shares must be notified on a daily basis to the Stock Exchange 
immediately after the transaction has been conducted and, at latest, before the beginning of 
the next trading day. In a normal share repurchase case, the repurchases must be notified to 
the Stock Exchange before the end of the post-trading session and in a minor case before the 
next trading day. Additionally, in an exceptionally large acquisition where the acquired 
amount exceeds the allowed 10%, the Stock Exchange must immediately be informed of the 
transaction in question. The disclosed information on a share acquisition should include the 
following details: 
- The name of the company in question 
- Transaction date 
- Stock class 
- Quantity of shares 
- Price per share 
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- Total transaction price 
- Date of notification 
- Signature 
To prevent insider trading and other exploitation related to acquisitions of own shares, a 
company should act in trading in its own shares so that such trading does not weaken 
confidence in the securities markets. It is not recommended e.g. that a commission is given 
during the 14 day period immediately preceding the release of the financial statements or the 
interim report or during such longer period of time that the company has prescribed for the 
insiders of the company.  
 
2.2.2 Share repurchase regulation in Finland compared to other countries 
Legislation about share repurchases is fairly strict in Finland compared to the legislation, e.g., 
in the USA. In Finland, companies are required to disclose nearly everything concerning 
share repurchases. Most of the studies regarding share repurchases are done in the US where 
the legislation and disclosure requirements differ significantly. As opposed to Finland were 
all companies are obligated to disclose all the information concerning actual share 
repurchases on a daily basis, the practice is completely different in the US where companies 
do not have to disclose any information if own shares are acquired. The lack of credible data 
is the most important reason why actual share repurchases have not been widely investigated 
in the US stock markets. 
The key differences in the US and Finnish regulation on share repurchases are related to the 
length of authorization and maximum daily trading volumes. As in Finland the authorization 
has to be used within 18 months of the GM’s approval, the legislation in the US does not 
make such restrictions. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report that it is not unusual for US 
companies that repurchase programs are valid for several years and the amount of acquired 
shares is not limited. Another feature specific for share repurchases in Finland is that the 
maximum amount a company can acquire at each trading day is restricted to half of the 
average daily trading volume in four weeks preceding the actual repurchase. The 
corresponding trading limitation is 25 percent in many other countries.    
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2.3 Tax Considerations 
In the latest tax reform at the beginning of 2005, the taxation for capital gains and dividends 
in Finland changed materially. Until 2005, Finland had a full imputation system of corporate 
tax which prevented double taxation. Tax rate for dividends as well as for corporations was 29 
percent. In the old system, when dividends were paid to shareholders, corporate taxes were 
deductible and the effective tax rate, corporate taxes included, was only 29 percent. This 
system was removed in order to harmonize the legislation in EU countries and bring Finnish 
legislation closer to EU standards. After the renewal of the system, the tax rate for capital 
gains is 28% and for corporations 26%. Nowadays, the dividends received from publicly 
listed companies are partially tax-free, since 30% of the received dividends are not taxable. 
The remaining 70% is taxed at a tax rate of 28%. This means that the profit generated by a 
company is taxed two times as first the company pays 26% tax for its profits and after that 
shareholder pays tax for the capital gains. As a result, the taxation for dividends are lower 
than capital gains, since the effective tax rates are 19.6% and 28% respectively.  
There is also another recent change in the Finnish legislation and tax treatment of dividends 
between Finland and USA that might affect the popularity of share acquisitions in the future. 
A central point in the tax convention between USA and Finland, which came into force on 
28.12.2007, is that dividends received by pension institutions and pension funds will be 
exempt, subject to certain conditions, from the present 15 percent withholding tax (Ministry 
of Finance, 2006). The effect of this tax treaty can be seen e.g. in Nokia, which increased the 
amount of dividends distributed to shareholders and decreased the amount of shares to be 
repurchased. 
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3 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
At the time when Miller and Modigliani (1961) conducted their famous study about payout 
policy, share repurchases were not in use. According to their theory, different payout policies 
should not affect the firm value if markets are perfect and investors behave rationally. As a 
result, firm value is dependent only by the underlying cash-flows of the firm. If we ignore 
taxation and transaction costs, share repurchases are identical to a dividend payment when 
distributing cash to shareholders. In theoretical world of efficient and perfect markets the 
above-mentioned theory may hold, but in reality the markets are often far from perfect and 
thus, the payout policy may have an impact on firm value. The literature about share 
repurchases presents credible evidence that the payout method does matter, since share 
repurchase announcements have generated significant positive market reactions in the past 
decades. 
In this chapter, I will go through the historical evidence of abnormal returns around share 
repurchase announcements as well as around the initial actual repurchases. Also the literature 
and evidence of liquidity effects around share repurchases announcements will be presented.  
 
3.1 Evidence of Abnormal Returns of Share Repurchase Announcements 
The announcement effects of share repurchase programs have been widely studied in the past 
decades. Historically, share repurchase announcements have generated a significant positive 
market reaction in share prices regardless of the repurchase method used. Most of the 
previous studies are made with US data but there are also a few studies made by McNally 
(2002 and 2006) with Canadian data and one by Karhunen (2002) with Finnish data. The 
summary of market reactions around share repurchase announcements found in different 
studies is presented in Table 1. 
All in all, fixed-price tender offers have generated the largest positive market reactions around 
share repurchase announcements. The earliest studies made by Masulis (1980), Dann (1981), 
Vermaelen (1981) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) studied the market reaction of 
fixed-price tender offers with samples from the 1960’s and 1970’s and found market reactions 
around +15 per cent. The later studies by Comment and Jarrel (1991) and Lie and McConnell 
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(1998), applied data from 1980’s and found substantially smaller, but still statistically 
significant, positive announcement returns of +8 per cent.  
Dutch auction tender offers have increased the shareholders wealth by slightly less than 8 per 
cent. According to Comment and Jarrel (1991), who compare the three forms of common 
stock repurchases, Dutch-auction self-tender offers and open-market share repurchase 
programs seem to be weaker signals of stock undervaluation than fixed-price self-tender 
offers and thus result in smaller positive stock returns after the announcement. 
The market reactions to open-market share repurchase program announcements are 
substantially smaller compared to the two other methods presented above. Typically, the 
average abnormal return around open-market share repurchase announcement has been 
around +3 per cent in the US. A similar positive share price reaction in Finland has been 
detected by Karhunen (2002). An interesting finding is that the market reaction is only around 
+1 per cent in Canada. Many studies have found proof that the announcements of repurchase 
programs are usually preceded by weak share price performance and followed by a good 
share price performance with an effect even up to four years (see e.g. Ikenberry et al., 1995). 
At least two explanations have been proposed on why open-market share repurchase 
announcements generate notably smaller market reactions than the other methods. Firstly, 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) propose that open-market repurchase programs do not provide 
a strong enough and credible signal that the share is undervalued, since an announcement and 
authorization for repurchases are not commitments for the firm. Comment and Jarrel (1991) 
argue that the proportion of shares repurchased explains the different market reaction. 
According to their study in the US, the average proportion of shares repurchased was 19 per 
cent in fixed-price tender offers, 15 per cent in Dutch auctions and only 5 per cent in open-
market repurchase programs.    
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Table 1: 
Summary of evidence on short-term abnormal returns around share repurchase announcements for the 
three most important share repurchase methods. 
 
1
 The announcement effect is computed from five days before the announcement until ten days after the 
expiration. 2 The mean abnormal announcement return is the average total return for sample firms in the 
announcement month adjusted for the respective Toronto Stock Exchange index total return. 
 
3.2 Evidence of Liquidity Effects to Share Repurchase Announcements 
A number of studies have examined the effects of share repurchases on liquidity from various 
perspectives. Empirical studies of trading activities (such as trading volume and bid-ask 
spreads surrounding announcement of share repurchases) have been, however, rare and 
generally explained by the lack of data. In addition, the results of previous research on the 
liquidity impact of share repurchases are mixed. In some studies, share repurchases have been 
found to increase liquidity while other studies have come to the opposite conclusion. This 
Method Study
Sample 
period
Sample 
size
Event 
window
Announcement 
effect
Fixed-price tender offer
Masulis (1980) 1963-1978 199 [-1;+1] 16,90 %
Dann (1981) 1962-1976 143 [-1;+1] 15,41 %
Vermaelen (1981) 1970-1978 131 [-1;+1] 15,22 %
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) 1962-1986 221 1 12,54 %
Comment and Jarrell (1991) 1984-1988 93 [-1;+1] 8,30 %
Lie and McConnell (1998) 1981-1994 116 [-1;+1] 7,90 %
Dutch auction
Comment and Jarrell (1991) 1984-1988 72 [-1;+1] 7,50 %
Bagwell (1992) 1981-1988 31 [0] 7,70 %
Lie and McConnell (1998) 1981-1994 91 [-1;+1] 7,70 %
Open market
Vermaelen (1981) 1970-1978 243 [-1;+1] 3,67 %
Ikenberry et. al. (1995) 1980-1990 1239 [-2;+2] 3,54 %
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 1981-1990 370 [-1;+1] 2,69 %
Ikenberry et. al. (2000) 1989-1997 1060 2 0,93 %
Kahle (2002) 1993-1996 712 [-1;+1] 1,60 %
Karhunen (2002) 1998-2001 155 [-1;+1] 1,86 %
[-2;+2] 2,78 %
McNally (2002) 1989-1998 396 [-1;+2] 1,06 %
Chan et. al. (2004) 1980-1996 5508 [-2;+2] 2,18 %
Grullon and Michaely (2004) 1980-1997 4443 [-1;+1] 2,71 %
Li and McNally (2006) 1987-2000 901 [-1;+2] 0,73 %
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study, as well as most of the other studies, use daily closing bid-ask spreads to measure the 
changes in liquidity. In addition to measuring liquidity by bid-ask spread, I will also study the 
changes in trading volumes with different methods.  
One obvious reason why liquidity could decrease due to share repurchases is that the number 
of shares outstanding decreases. In addition, changes in bid-ask spreads have been widely 
explained with information asymmetries because repurchase managers are better informed 
traders in the market and thus, increase the adverse-selection cost component of the bid-ask 
spread and hence decrease liquidity.  
In the following section, I will divide studies about liquidity surrounding an announcement of 
a share repurchase program or an announcement of an initial actual share repurchase to three 
different categories. First, studies which are associated with liquidity decrease (bid-ask spread 
increases) and support the liquidity decrease hypothesis. Second, studies that find evidence of 
liquidity increases (bid-ask spread decreases) and support the liquidity increase hypothesis. 
And finally the third category, where scholars have not found any significant changes in 
liquidity. 
Barclay and Smith (1988) were the first scholars to argue that after the share repurchase 
announcement the existence of asymmetric information increases and that the bid-ask spread 
widens and liquidity goes down. Their findings are in line with their hypothesis and the bid-
ask spread for US firms widen after an announcement of a share repurchase. Findings by 
Brockman and Chung (2001), who analyze the liquidity effects on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, are also in line with information asymmetry hypothesis and detect an increase in 
the bid-ask spreads and decrease in liquidity during repurchase periods. Also their evidence 
suggests that there are information asymmetries (i.e. repurchase managers trade on 
information advantage).  
The first study that find increases in liquidity surrounding a share repurchase announcement 
was conducted by Franz, Rao and Tripathy (1995). They studied the bid-ask spread in the 
NASDAQ market and argue that share repurchases decrease information asymmetries and the 
adverse selection component of the spread and thus increase liquidity. Cook et al. (2004) 
studied the liquidity issue surrounding actual repurchase days and found that share 
repurchases, especially in NASDAQ shares, increase liquidity and bid-ask spread decreases 
surrounding the repurchase transactions. 
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There are also scholars who studied bid-ask spreads without finding any significant results 
whether the liquidity increases or decreases. Kim (2005) examined if a liquidity change in the 
U.S. market will be larger in a firm with higher degree of pre-announcement information 
asymmetry. According to his results, there is no significant change in liquidity across firms 
with differing degrees of information asymmetry. Singh et al. (1994) find out that bid-ask 
spread increases before the announcement but find no evidence that the spread would increase 
also after the announcement. Wiggins (1994), Miller and McConnell (1995) and De Ridder 
and Råsbrant (2004) have also studied the bid-ask spreads surrounding the announcement date 
but have not found evidence of a significant change in liquidity. 
De Ridder and Råsbrant (2004) studied the liquidity effects of share repurchases in Sweden 
between 2000 and 2003. They found a 7 per cent increase in trading volume on the date of the 
announcement as well as on the the first day when actual repurchases take place. They found 
a higher trading volume in the period surrounding the actual repurchase date compared to the 
announcement day. In addition to this, they studied the relative change in the bid-ask spread 
on the first month after a repurchase but did not find a significant change. 
 
3.3 Why Do Companies Repurchase Shares? 
The financial literature has explored various motivations for share repurchases but it has 
focused on five hypotheses that may explain the abnormal returns observed on the time of an 
announcement of a share repurchase program. According to these hypotheses, companies buy 
back shares to: (1) signal to the market that their share is undervalued, (2) distribute excess 
cash flows to its shareholders, (3) change the capital structure, (4) take advantage of the 
different taxation on repurchases compared to dividends (5) increase the earnings per share 
(EPS) and struggle against the dilution effects when employee stock options are exercised. 
There are also some other motivations behind the repurchases which will be presented in this 
chapter. Depending on the circumstances of a company, it may have several motivations to 
repurchase its own shares and in Finland at least one reason has to be disclosed together with 
the announcement. 
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3.3.1 Signaling hypothesis 
Signaling hypothesis has become the most important theory that explains the observed market 
reaction around the announcement of a repurchase program. According to Brau and Holmes 
(2006), the managerial signaling hypothesis2 is based on asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders. Managers have private information about the company and the 
value of the firm. If the management considers that the company’s share is undervalued and 
see it as a good investment, they may communicate the information to the market by 
announcing share repurchases. On the other hand, firm’s announcement to repurchase shares 
might also be a signal that the firm has no profitable investment targets. 
There is substantial evidence supporting asymmetric information as a reason for share 
repurchases. According to Ikenberry et. al. (1995) signaling hypothesis holds in two ways. 
First, management have private information of future outlook and they try to communicate the 
information to the market through share repurchases or announcements. Second, the managers 
have noticed that the company is undervalued and they exploit this by announcing a share 
repurchase program. McNally et. al. (2006) find that companies making repurchases exhibit 
firm-specific timing ability, which supports the assumption that firms have asymmetric 
information. They find that abnormal returns are significantly negative over the five days 
before the repruchase trades and that companies tend to buy during short-run dips in share 
price. 
Brav et al. (2005) found in a survey made to financial executives of repurchasing firms that 
payout policy is an effective method to convey information to the market. The most common 
answer by financial executives was that “payout decisions convey information about our 
company to investors”. They also argue that managers use share repurchases as a consequence 
of undervaluation. Another survey made by Baker et al. (2003) found that undervaluation is 
the most important reason, why companies acquire their own shares. However, 
undervaluation motive for share repurchases is contradicted in a study made by Karhunen 
(2002) in Finland as only 10% of repurchases were motivated by undervaluation. 
Many researches investigating the signaling effect of share repurchases concentrate on the 
firm-specific determinants that may affect the magnitude of the market reaction. The most 
                                                 
2
 Signaling hypothesis is also known as “the undervaluation” or “the asymmetric information” hypothesis. 
17 
 
important and often mentioned single factor in favor of signaling hypothesis is that share 
repurchases programs are very often preceded by share’s negative abnormal performance (e.g. 
Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrel, 1991). Comment and Jarrel (1991) also suggest that 
negative share price performance is followed by share repurchases which are, again, followed 
by good earnings and share price performance. Multivariate analyses by Vermaelen (1981), 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) as well as Chan et. al. (2004) show a negative relationship 
between the earlier share price performance and the announcement period abnormal return. 
This implies that the share price reaction is more positive after the announcement whereas the 
share price performance has been weak before the announcement. 
Finally, it has been argued that small companies are less followed by financial analysts, their 
institutional ownership is lower and they are less visible in the financial media. Thus, they 
may find an announcement of share repurchase program the only way to reduce information 
asymmetries. When information asymmetries exist, the companies should be willing to 
convey information to the market that their share price is undervalued. Vermaelen (1981) 
finds that small firms are expected to signal more information to the market when they 
acquire their own shares. According to many studies (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998, Grullon 
and Michaely, 2004, Chan et. al. 2004), abnormal returns around the announcement day are 
negatively related to firm size which means that it is harder for small companies to 
communicate information to the market and more likely that there is information asymmetries 
but that these firms generate higher announcement period abnormal returns. 
 
3.3.2 Free Cash Flow hypothesis 
Free cash flow hypothesis is another important theory on share repurchases and suggests that 
cash flows in excess of what is required by the business, should be distributed to shareholders. 
According to Jensen (1986), the positive market reaction relating to share repurchases is due 
to reduced agency costs. Jensen (1986) suggests also that share repurchases are a good way to 
distribute excess cash to shareholders because managers’ objectives differ from those of 
shareholders and that the presence of internally generated cash flow in excess of that required 
to maintain existing assets in place and to finance new positive NPV projects, creates 
potential for those funds to be misspent. Jensen also argues that share repurchases are an 
efficient way of alleviating agency problems when repurchases are financed by new debt.  
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A traditional way of distributing cash to owners is to pay dividends but open-market share 
repurchases have grown rapidly relative to dividends in the past decade (Fairchild, 2006). 
This can be explained by that repurchases are a more flexible way of distributing cash to 
shareholders because they do not have to be made on specific dates and open-market 
repurchase announcement is not a firm commitment of actual repurchases (Brav et al., 2005). 
Dividends are again more precise because they are, in Finland, dealt once a year and are fairly 
constant year after year. Dividend cuts are associated to negative market reactions because it 
is seen as a commitment to pay the same dividends in the coming years. In line with previous 
studies Stephens & Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Brav et al. (2005) find 
that firms use share repurchases to pay out cash that have a low probability of being 
sustainable. 
Jagannathan et al. (2000) suggest that companies with higher permanent operating cash flows 
prefer dividends, whereas companies with higher temporary non-operating cash flows prefer 
share repurhases. This means that companies using dividends when distributing cash to 
owners have less volatile cash flows. Guffey and Schneider (2004) examined the financial 
characteristics of US firms engaging in share repurchase activity compared with those not 
engaging in such activity. They found that most important explanation for repurchases comes 
from variables associated with free cash flow hypothesis. 
Li and McNally (2007) and Kahle (2002) find that the amount of free cash flow is positively 
related to abnormal returns around repurchase announcements, whereas Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) find the same reaction to the overall level of cash in the firm. They find that the 
systematic risk and cost of capital declines in companies who repurchase own shares as well 
as stronger relationship between the amount of cash and market reaction for firms that are 
likely to overinvest. 
 
3.3.3 Leverage hypothesis 
Lane et al. (1989) suggest that managers frequently mention leverage as an important motive 
for share repurchases. According to the leverage hypotheses, companies increase, their debt-
to-equity ratios by repurchasing shares and at the same time lower the total amount of shares 
outstanding. The desired outcome is to increase the firm value by exploiting tax deductability 
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of interest payments on new debt and pursue the optimal leverage ratio. According to the 
theory, tax savings are transferred to shareholders which explains the positive market 
reaction. The case in Finland is not that straightforward due to share repurchase restrictions 
which were 5% of share capital up to 2005 and 10% from 2005 onwards. This limits 
significantly the potential tax savings from new debt. In tender offers, where the acquired 
amount of shares is significant capital structure can be changed materially, whereas open-
market share repurchases are more fine-tuning of capital structure. As a result, the magnitude 
of this hypothesis to market reaction is naturally highly dependent on the amount shares 
repurchased and how it is financed. 
Chan et al. (2004) find that companies who repurchase shares in order to alter their capital 
structure do not generate larger abnormal returns on the time of the announcement of a share 
repurchase program. The survey made by Brav et al. (2005) shows that only 28.2 per cent of 
financial executives answer that changing debt-to-equity ratios is an important factor when 
considering share repurchases. Compared to signaling and free cash-flow hypotheses, 
leverage hypothesis does not seem to be a key motivation to share repurchases and hence, do 
not play significant role in explaining their market reaction. 
Bondholder expropriation hypothesis is closely related to leverage hypothesis. Dann (1981) 
suggests that according to bondholder expropriation hypothesis an unexpected share 
repurchase transfers wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Dann found some evidence to 
support his argument but effect was not economically significant. Unexpected wealth 
transfers are mitigated by covenants in bonds restricting repurchases and the general 
restrictions by law.  
 
3.3.4 Dividend substitution hypothesis 
The use of share repurchases has been explained by different tax treatment of capital gains 
and dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that tax affairs are significant determinants 
of the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. These findings when substituting 
dividends with share repurchases, were true in some countries such as US and UK. However, 
the recent amendments to the Canadian and US legislation have made dividends more 
competitive from tax perspective and many institutions and pension funds do not pay taxes on 
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dividends. In Finland it has had only little relevance due to equal tax treatment for both 
dividends and capital gains, especially for domestic shareholders. However, dividends are 
nowadays taxed at an effective tax rate of 19.6 per cent whereas capital gains are taxed at 28 
per cent. Foreign investors from countries where taxation is softer for capital gains, benefit 
when company pays out excess cash through share repurchases compared to dividends. In 
fact, study made by Liljeblom and Pasternack (2006) with Finnish data strongly indicates that 
higher foreign ownership is related to higher likelihood for share repurchases and explains 
this with tax-related factors. 
Brav et al. (2005) report in their survey that financial executives view tax affairs as a minor 
factor when considering share repurchases or the company’s payout policy. Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) find that although the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 greatly reduced the 
relative tax advantage of capital gains, the gap between the top marginal rate on ordinary 
income and the marginal rate on capital gains is still positive and significant. This evidence 
argues against that taxes would have a significant role when considering share repurchases and 
supports the proposition. 
According to the dividend substitution hypothesis, the positive market reaction is due to an 
unanticipated announcement of share repurchases and the shareholders receiving tax-benefits 
from share repurchases instead of dividends. Critique against the hypothesis has been put by 
Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) who express doubts in their independent studies about 
tender offers. They question whether the tax-benefits can explain the substantial 10% 
announcement effect.  
 
3.3.5 Increasing bump hypothesis and offset dilution effect of stock options 
A very common explanation for starting a repurchase program is to increase the earnings per 
share by decreasing the number of shares outstanding. According the survey made by Brav et 
al. (2005) to corporate executives, increasing earnings per share is the second most important 
reason when considering share repurchases. In the survey, 76.1 percent per cent of 
respondents explain that increasing earnings per share is an important or very important factor 
in the payout decision. 
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Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) suggest that investment bankers and analysts often cite the 
increase in earnings per share, if not the primary, as a key benefit of share repurchases. They 
also point out that, as long as earnings fall by less in percentage terms than the percentage of 
shares outstanding, then earnings per share will indeed go up and if we assume that the 
market sets prices by mechanically capitalizing reported EPS at common multiples, share 
prices will also go up. Behind the motivation for increasing earnings per share is a hidden 
assumption that the firm has idle or unproductive assets and by distributing these excess funds 
to shareholders the firm’s ability to generate higher EPS increases. The theory suggests that if 
company has only negative NPV projects, then the excess cash should be reallocated to better 
uses. However, if positive NPV investment projects exist, then distributing excess by share 
repurchases may actually destroy shareholder value. 
Decreasing the amount of shares outstanding is not a very unambiguous thing, since it may 
not actually decrease the amount of shares outstanding at the end of the repurchase program 
due to the employee stock options. When company repurchases its own shares, at the same 
time it most often issues shares in order to fulfill the company’s employee stock options. 
According to a study by Li and McNally (2007), the real number of shares of repurchasing 
companies actually increases by 4.73 per cent while the corresponding figure of companies 
who do not make share repurchases amounts 10.02 per cent. They argue that the number of 
shares outstanding rises because of the exercise of stock options and convertible securities. 
Thus, the main impact of repurchases is not that they reduce shares outstanding, but that they 
slow the rate of dilution. Preventing the dilution effect is also supported by Kahle (2002) and 
Brav et al. (2005) who find in their survey that 67.6 per cent of respondents see that offsetting 
the dilutionary effect of stock option plans or other stock-based compensation programs is the 
third most important factor when considering share repurchases.  
 
3.3.6 Takeover defense 
According to Sidharth (1991), share repurchases that are usually financed by new debt are a 
common response of target management to a real or perceived takeover threat. Targeted 
repurchase or greenmail, where management buys out the holdings an actual or potential take-
over bid candidate, is a defensive action against hostile take-over. However, share repurchases 
used as takeover defense in Finland are very rare due to small takeover activity. 
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4 DATA AND METHODS 
4.1 Data 
4.1.1 Sample Identification 
This study focuses on all listed Finnish companies trading on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
that have announced open market share repurchase programs during the period between 
January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2008. I will examine all open market share repurchase 
programs authorized by the General Meeting of shareholders regardless of the execution level. 
The announcements of share repurchase programs and initial actual share repurchases were 
identified from Kauppalehti online3 database for stock exchange releases, NASDAQ OMX 
4database of corporate press releases and companies’ homepages.  I was able to find 96 
companies that have made public 476 share repurchase program announcements. However, 
ten announcements were excluded from the final sample. Six of them were excluded, 
according to a common practice, because these companies operate in the financial sector. In 
addition, four events had to be excluded due to lack of data during the event window. As a 
result, the final sample consists of 93 companies that announced 466 share repurchase 
authorizations. The sample sizes vary in the calculations presented in the sixth chapter 
according to the data which is required to perform the tests. The used sample size is specified 
one at a time in each calculation. A complete list of the sample firms and events are presented 
in Appendix 1. 
The majority of repurchase program announcements come in the form of board’s proposal to 
the shareholders meeting as described in the second chapter. This proposal includes often 
other information as well, e.g. information about dividends and other proposals. Although 
announcements include additional information, they are not excluded from the final sample 
due to substantial loss of data. This practice is in line with the past studies by Karhunen 
(2002) as well as by, e.g., Comment and Jarrel (1991) whose findings are similar for the 
whole sample and for the cleaned sub-sample.  
The data on actual share repurchases is relatively easy to collect in Finland because of strict 
disclosure requirements described in the second chapter of the study. The firms are required 
                                                 
3
 www.kauppalehti.fi 
4
 http://nasdaqomx.com/whoweare/newsroom/ 
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to disclose practically all information related to acquisitions of own shares and information is 
available online. The final sample in the analysis related to actual repurchases consists of 133 
initial repurchases for 58 companies. A complete list of companies that acquired their own 
shares are presented in Appendix 1. 
The identified companies are listed or have been listed on the OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(In appendix 1, companies are listed according to the latest name. For example, Ramirent 
PLC used to be A-Rakennusmies in 1999). The stock price information and daily returns as 
well as the OMX Helsinki CAP index are collected from the Thomson ONE Banker database 
for all sample companies. In OMX Helsinki CAP index the weight of one security is limited 
to 10% compared to OMX Helsinki index where Nokia’s weight is dominating. The returns 
are based on closing prices with adjustments for splits, stock dividends and cash dividends. 
The risk free rate used in the calculations is one year Finnish government bond and this is 
retrieved from Datastream. Thomson ONE Banker database is also used for collecting 
relevant accounting information for the sample companies. The missing information is 
retrieved from the companies’ financial statements. Data used in the liquidity calculations is 
also retrieved from Thomson ONE Banker database. Trading volume and number of shares 
outstanding are gathered for each trading day and bid and ask prices are daily closing prices. 
Information on foreign ownership is gathered from the database of Euroclear Finland Oy5 
(former Finnish Central Securities Depository or Arvopaperikeskus in Finnish), which stores 
statistics of foreign ownership on a monthly basis. The month I have used in the analysis is 
the previous month to the event. 
 
4.2 The Methodology 
4.2.1 Event Study 
In this study, to measure the price effects and CARs of share repurchase announcements and 
initial actual share repurchases, I conducted a standard (single index) market model event 
study. The event study method is first introduced by Fama et al. (1969), who proposed a new 
event study methodology for measuring the effects of actions and events on security prices. 
The event study methodology was later described more rigorously by Brown and Warner 
                                                 
5
 www.euroclear.eu (former Finnish Central Securities Depository or Arvopaperikeskus) 
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(1985). The model was initially formed and used to examine if market adjusts rapidly to new 
information. I will go through briefly the event study methodology in the following.  
 The first step in the model is to estimate the standard market model parameters for all the 
events. The estimated parameters α and β are figured out by regressing each company’s daily 
excess returns against the overall market’s daily excess returns over a period starting 205 
trading days and ending six trading days before an announcement of a repurchase program or 
before an initial repurchase (Formula 1). The estimated parameters are αi and βi in the 
following expression: 
 
, −  ,	 =   +  , −  ,	 (1) 
 
where ri,t is the daily logarithmic return of the firm i at day t, rf,t the daily risk-free rate6 at day 
t and rm,t the daily logarithmic return for the market’s stock index7 at day t. In some events I 
was not able to estimate the parameters for the whole time period (-205 to -6) due to the lack 
of data, so I extended the period to include the missing number of days after the event 
window.  
After the market model parameters (alfa and beta) are estimated, the next step is to calculate 
the expected excess returns for the event window surrounding each share repurchase 
announcement or initial actual share repurchase (Formula 2). In order to find out the CARs, 
we must calculate abnormal returns (ARt) on a day t for a given security i (Formula 3). The 
average daily abnormal returns for the whole sample are calculated according the Formula 4. 
 
, −  ,	 =   +  , − ,	 (2) 
, =  , − , +   +  , −  ,	 (3) 
                                                 
6
 Finnish government bond (1-year). The data is retrieved from Datastream database. 
7
 OMX Helsinki CAP index 
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In Equations (2) – (4), i refers to the firm announcing a repurchase program or an initial actual 
share repurchase, t is the day and n is the number of companies in the sample. The cumulative 
average abnormal return during an event window of [-T;+T] is calculated by summing up the 
daily average abnormal returns over the event window as follows (Formula 5): 
 
  =   !"#"  (5) 
 
To analyze the CARs statistical significance and to calculate the t-statistic, I need the average 
cumulative abnormal returns (Formula 5) and the standard deviation of average daily 
abnormal returns which is calculated as follows (Formula 6 and 7): 
 
%() =  & 1199  ( −  )(
#)
#(*+ ,
(  (6) 
where 
 =  1199  
#)
#(*+  (7) 
 
As can be seen from Formula (6), the standard deviation of average daily abnormal return is 
the standard deviation of the average residuals of the company making an announcement over 
the 200-day market model estimation period. 
By exploiting the results of the Formulas (5) and (6), it enables to calculate the t-statistic for 
the average CAR with the null hypothesis of zero for the announcement effect of CAR over 
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the investigated event window [-T;+T]. According to the results of the t-satistic Formula 
below (Formula 8), conclusions can be carried out about the statistical significance regarding 
abnormal retuns or losses on announcement effects or initial actual share repurchases at 
different significance levels. 
 
/ =   %( ) =   
 −  011 ℎ345/ℎ6787%( )90:;6 5< =>37 8 /ℎ6 6?6/ @8=5@
 (8) 
 
4.2.2 Multivariate Regressions 
A series of regression analyses is applied to find out the relationships between the cumulative 
abnormal returns and the key determinants behind them. The cumulative abnormal returns are 
regressed on sets of explanatory variables which, according to findings of earlier studies, can 
be expected to have an effect on shareholder wealth in share repurchase activities.  
When building up regression models, it is important to study multicollinearity (i.e. correlation 
between two or more explanatory variables) because high correlation between explanatory 
variables may lead to large standard deviations for the coefficient estimates and therefore 
difficulties in identifying statistically significant determinants. As the correlation matrix of 
Table 2 shows, two correlation coefficients (LN of market capitalization and foreign 
ownership, cash and equivalents / total assets and long term debt / total assets) are actually 
higher than 0.5 meaning that there might exist multicollinearity between independent 
variables (Garson, 2009). According to Garson (2009), multicollinearity can be studied and 
questioned by collinearity statistics, such as tolerance and VIF (variance-inflation factor) 
measures. In sum, multicollinearity should not cause problems in this case when interpreting 
the regression coefficients as the explanatory variables have tolerance over 0.2 and VIF-
figures below 5.0.  
The explanatory variables used in this study’s regressions include company-specific financial 
ratios, foreign ownership percentages and dummy variables. The explanatory variables are 
presented more rigorously in the following: 
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PRE-EVENT CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN [-200, -21]: A variable calculated to 
reflect the long-term return before the announcement of a share repurchase program. 
PRE-EVENT CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN [-20, -3]: A variable calculated to 
reflect the short-term return before the announcement of a share repurchase program. 
FIRM SIZE: This value is the natural logarithm of market value. Market value is the total 
value of outstanding shares at the end of the year. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK: A ratio reflecting the market capitalization at the latest balance sheet 
date to book value of total assets at the latest balance sheet date. 
FREE CASH FLOW / TOTAL ASSETS: A financial ratio reflecting the free cash flow at the 
latest balance sheet date before the announcement and the market value of its assets defined 
by the sum of total debt and market value of equity. 
CASH AND EQUIVALENTS / TOTAL ASSETS: A financial ratio reflecting the size of cash 
reserves before the authorization. The ratio is calculated as book value of cash and cash 
equivalents at the latest balance sheet date before the authorization divided by market value of 
assets. 
TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL ASSETS: A financial ratio reflecting the leverage ratio. The ratio is 
calculated as book value of total debt at the latest balance sheet date before the authorization 
divided by market value of assets. 
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP: A variable reflecting the percentage amount of foreign ownership 
in a company. 
PREVIOUS AUTHORIZATIONS: A dummy variable showing, whether a company has 
previous authorizations to buy back shares. If a company has previous authorizations the 
dummy variable gets a value of one, otherwise zero. 
ACTUAL REPURCHASES: A dummy variable showing, whether a company have utilized the 
authorization by the Annual General Meeting. If company has made share repurchases, the 
dummy gets a value of one, otherwise zero. 
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Table 2: 
Correlation Matrix on the Explanatory Variables of the Regression Model 
This table presents the correlation coefficients between different company related characteristics that are used to explain the Cumulative Abnormal Returns in the multivatiate regressions of this 
study. "Pre-event CAR (-200, -21)" is a variable that takes into account the long-term share price performance. "Pre-event CAR (-20, -3) reflects the short-term share price performance before 
an event. ”LN of Market Capitalization" is the natural logarithm of the latest year end market capitalization before an announcement. "Market-to-Book Equity Ratio" is the year end value before 
the announcement. "Free Cash Flow / Total Assets" is the ratio of free cash flow at the latest balance sheet date before the announcement and the market value of its assets (the sum of total debt 
and market value of equity). "Cash and Equivalents / Total Assets" is the company's cash and cash equivalents at the latest balance sheet date divided by its total assets as defined before. "Long-
Term Debt / Total Assets" is the ratio of company's book value of total long-term debt at the latest balance sheet date before the announcement and the market value of its total assets. "Foreign 
Ownership" is the percentage amount of shares owned by foreigners. "Prior Repurchase Program" is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company has had previous authorizations. 
"Actual Repurchases" is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company has made actual share repurchases. 
 
Pre-event CAR (-
200, -21)
Pre-event CAR (-
20,-3)
LN of Market 
Capitalization
Market-to-Book 
Equity Ratio
Free Cash Flow / 
Total Assets
Cash and 
Equivalents / 
Total Assets
Long-Term Debt 
/ Total Assets
Foreign 
Ownership
Prior 
Repurchase 
Program
Actual 
Repurchases
"Signaling Hypothesis"
Pre-event CAR (-200-21) 1.00
Pre-event CAR (-20,-3) 0.22 1.00
LN of Market Capitalization 0.00 -0.05 1.00
Market-to-Book Equity Ratio 0.00 0.04 0.28 1.00
"Free Cash Flow Hypothesis"
Free Cash Flow / Total Assets -0.04 -0.03 0.19 0.43 1.00
Cash and Equivalents / Total Assets -0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.25 0.19 1.00
"Leverage Hypothesis"
Long Term Debt / Total Assets -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.25 -0.26 -0.63 1.00
"Dividend Substitution Hypothesis"
Foreign Ownership -0.02 0.02 0.67 0.23 0.06 -0.10 0.03 1.00
Prior Repurchase Program -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 0.01 0.07 1.00
Actual Repurchases -0.02 -0.01 0.15 -0.05 0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.14 -0.02 1.00
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4.2.3 Liquidity effects 
Liquidity effects of share repurchases are a central focus area of this study. They are analyzed 
around the announcement of a repurchase program as well as around the first day an actual 
repurchase takes place. The methodology is the same as the one introduced and used by De 
Ridder and Råsbrant (2004). I study and analyze abnormal trading volume and bid-ask 
spreads for firms which have an authorization and for firms that have made actual 
repurchases. 
First, I study the change in trading volume around the announcement date and the initial share 
repurchase date. I have calculated this as a ratio between number of shares traded on a 
specific day and the average number of shares traded during the period -50 to -25 before share 
repurchase event. When analyzing the results, a ratio of more than one indicates that trading 
volume has increased on a specific day and ratio less than one indicates that trading volume is 
below its short-term average. Formula 9 shows the calculation steps. 
 
 ℎ>B6 8 />=8B ?510:6, = C>=8B D510:6, 125 ∑ C>=8B D510:6,#(+#+*
  (9) 
 
To figure out the abnormal trading volume, I first calculate the natural logarithm of turnover 
for firm i at day t. According to Lo and Wang (2000), to overcome problems with skewness 
and kurtosis, a logarithm of trading volume measure is used, more specificly, the logarithm 
between number of shares in firm i traded during day t divided by the number of outstanding 
shares in firm i traded during day t. The formula is as follows: 
 
FG C05?6 Ω,	 = FG I C>=8B D510:6,J0/7/>=8B %ℎ>67,K (10) 
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The abnormal trading volume is then calculated as the difference between LN Turnover 
(Formula 10) and the average LN Turnover estimated in the period -40 to -11 days. Thus the 
abnormal trading volume is given by the expression: 
 
;5:>1 C>=8B D510:6, =  Ω, −  M 130  Ω,
#
#N*
O (11) 
 
To test the hypothesis that bid-ask spreads remain unchanged at the time of an announcement 
of a share repurchase program or an initial actual repurchase, I use the relative spread which is 
calculated according to Formula 12. I try to find out whether there is a significant change in 
the relative Bid-Ask spread between the trading days -20 to -1 and +1 to +20. 
 
Cℎ6 61>/8?6  P8= − 7Q 746>= = (7Q 48R6 − P8= 48R6)&(7Q 48R6 + P8= 48R6)2 ,
 (12) 
 
To test whether companies use superior information in acquiring own shares for the first time 
in declining or bearish market, I analyze the return of the company against the return on the 
market as well as if an acquisition took place. This regression analysis follows the method 
used by Grullon and Ikenberry (2000): 
 
, =  * +  , + (,S +  T,SU +  V, (13) 
 
where Ri,t is the daily return for firm i acquiring own shares and α0 is the intercept of the 
regression. Rm,t is the daily value-weighted market return, γt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the market return is negative, zero otherwise, δt is dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
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repurchased any shares during day t and 0 otherwise. The interaction variable T,SU  
captures the impact we are interested in. It measures the market sensitivity of the company’s 
returns on days when both the market is declining and the company is acquiring shares. I 
expect a negative sign, their beta risk should be decreasing, on the estimated coefficient β3 if 
acquiring firms trade in a way that is supporting their shares in downturns. 
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5 HYPOTHESES 
This chapter introduces the main hypotheses of this study. The hypotheses are based on the 
key findings of earlier literature. The first two hypotheses focus on the wealth creation of the 
share repurchase announcements and initial actual share repurchases. The two other 
hypotheses are related to the liquidity effects surrounding the same events. I will also analyze 
the key findings of multivariate regressions which are formed to explain the motives for 
announcements. There are four hypotheses (motivations to share repurchases) to which I try 
to find support: Signaling hypothesis, Free Cash Flow hypothesis, Leverage hypothesis and 
Dividend Substitution hypothesis.  
 
5.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Events 
As mentioned earlier, share repurchase program announcement effects have been widely 
studied in the past decades. Historically share repurchase announcements, and especially 
open-market share repurchase announcements, have generated a significant positive market 
reaction. A typical abnormal return around the share repurchase announcements have been 
about 3% in the US. In Finland the announcement return has been slightly less than 3% but in 
Canada interestingly only around 1%. According to the earlier studies, managers seem to have 
some timing ability when they announce share repurchase programs. In Finland, the timing 
ability is not likely to be a significant factor since Finnish share repurchase announcements 
are usually included in the invitations to the Annual General Meetings which takes place in 
the springtime. However, it is interesting to study if repurchase announcements in Finland 
receive similar cumulative abnormal returns as found in other countries.  
Based on earlier studies, share repurchase announcements are usually a consequence of bad 
share price performance (Comment and Jarrell, 1991) and followed by a good share price 
performance with an effect even up to four years (Ikenberry et al., 1995). All in all, the market 
reaction to share repurchase announcements seems to have changed over time, as was seen on 
Table 1 where cumulative abnormal returns have decreased steadily. I expect to find similar 
patterns in Finland and smaller cumulative abnormal returns than Karhunen (2002). As the 
first hypothesis, I try to find support to the following: 
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H1:  An announcement of a share repurchase program has increased the shareholder 
value in the Finnish stock market during 1998 – 2008. 
I also try to find evidence if the announcement of the first actual share repurchase has 
increased the shareholder value during the event window. Karhunen (2002) studied the 
cumulative abnormal returns when the firm discloses that it will start actual repurchases. He 
found statistically significant (at 1% level) return of 1.08% at the event day and positive but 
not statistically significant returns of 0.65% and 0.56% for the periods [-1, +1] and [-2, +2], 
respectively. The second hypothesis that is related to initial actual share repurchases is 
presented as follows: 
H2: An initial actual share repurchase has increased shareholder value in the Finnish 
stock market during 1998 – 2008. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses on Key Drivers of Abnormal Returns 
The financial literature has presented a number of motivations for share repurchase programs 
but in the following, I will concentrate on four key hypotheses that may explain the abnormal 
returns observed at the time of an announcement of a share repurchase program. These four 
hypotheses are: signaling hypothesis, free cash flow hypothesis, leverage hypothesis and 
dividend substitution hypothesis. I will go briefly through these hypotheses and their 
empirical proxies in the following. 
The signaling hypothesis can be associated with three different elements. The first element is, 
misvaluation, where the hypothesis predicts that positive market reaction is negatively related 
to the earlier share price performance. The strong negative correlation between these two 
variables is presented by Comment and Jarrell (1991). The second element is studied by 
Vermaelen (1981) who finds that announcement period returns and firm size has a strong 
negative correlation because of information asymmetries. According to him, small companies 
are linked to higher information asymmetries than large firms. Thus, the increase in share 
prices for small firms are larger since share repurchase programs reveal valuable information 
to the market. According to Ikenberry et al. (1995), undervaluation is the third important 
reason motivating share repurchases. To distinguish undervaluation from other motivations, 
they sorted firms on the basis of book-to-market ratios (later converted to market-to-book 
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ratio). They argue that undervaluation is more likely to drive repurchases by high book-to-
market companies, while other reasons may motivate repurchases announced by companies 
with low ratios. 
Free cash flow hypothesis suggests that cash flow in excess of what is needed to daily 
operations should be distributed to shareholders. According to Jensen (1986), positive market 
reaction is due to reduced agency costs. I use two variables to assess the amount of financial 
slack in the firm and to test the free cash flow hypothesis: free cash flow divided by total 
assets as well as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. 
According to leverage hypothesis, companies increase their debt-to-equity ratios by 
repurchasing shares and lowering the total amount of shares outstanding. Masulis (1980) and 
Vermaelen (1981) propose that firms can get closer to the optimal capital structure by 
repurchasing shares with debt, increase the interest tax shield and therefore increase the firm 
value. According to Li and McNally (2007) the announcement period return should be 
inversely related to the firm’s debt level, because the potential benefits are due to increased 
leverage of the firm. I proxy the leverage hypothesis by a ratio of total debt and total assets. 
Dividend substitution hypothesis8 is closely related to taxation because outside Finland 
dividends have mostly been more heavily taxed than capital gains. As an increasing number 
of investors in the Finnish market are from countries, such as United States, were repurchases 
have a tax-advantage the hypothesis is valid also in this study. According to the tax 
hypothesis, there should be a positive relation between abnormal returns and the amount of 
foreign ownership.  
In addition to the variable related to the above-mentioned four hypotheses, I include two 
dummy variables in the regressions. First dummy variable “Prior repurchase program” gets a 
value of one if the company has had previous authorizations of share repurchases, and zero 
otherwise. The second dummy variable “Actual repurchases” gets a value of one if a company 
has made previous share repurchases, and zero otherwise. Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses 
presented above and their proxies. 
  
                                                 
8
 Dividend distribution hypothesis is also known as Tax hypothesis 
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Table 3: 
Predicted Relationships between the Market Reaction and Selected Explanatory Variables 
 
 
5.3 Liquidity Effects around Events 
The next two hypotheses are related to liquidity effects around share repurchase 
announcements and first actual repurchases. I approach and test these hypotheses with three 
different methods: changes in trading volume, abnormal trading volume and the relative bid-
ask spreads. The findings in previous research on liquidity impact are mixed and do not 
provide conclusive evidence whether liquidity increase or decrease. Thus, I have two 
hypotheses that assume that liquidity remains the same before and after an event. 
H3: An announcement of a share repurchase program does not have an effect on 
liquidity / trading volume in the Finnish stock market during 1998 – 2008. 
H4: An initial actual share repurchase does not have an effect on liquidity / trading 
volume in the Finnish stock market during 1998 – 2008. 
 
  
Hypothesis Proxy for Explanatory Variable Expected Sign
"Signaling Hypothesis" Misvaluation Pre-event CAR -
Information Asymmetries Size -
Undervaluation Market-to-Book -
"Free Cash Flow Hypothesis" Free Cash Flow FCF / Assets +
Excess Cash Cash and Equivalents / Assets +
"Leverage Hypothesis" Optimal Capital Structure Debt / Assets -
"Dividend Substitution Hypothesis" Tax Reasons Foreign Ownership (%) +
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6 RESULTS ON THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF SHARE REPURCHASE 
ANNOUNCEMENTS AND INITIAL ACTUAL REPURCHASES 
This chapter presents the results of the market reaction to share repurchase announcements 
and initial actual share repurchases. Also results regarding the liquidity effects surrounding 
the same events are presented. In addition to this, I will go through and analyze the results of 
multivariate regressions that measure the determinants of potential abnormal returns 
associated with share repurchases. I have calculated all tests for the total sample as well as for 
the two sub-samples, large firms and small firms, to find out the different behavior in share 
prices and in liquidity measures. 
6.1 Announcement Period Returns 
The cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of share repurchase programs 
and initial actual share repurchases are calculated according to the methodology described in 
chapter 4. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for five different event windows 
between the period 20 days before and 20 days after the announcement date. Table 4 presents 
the cumulative abnormal returns for the whole sample and for two sub-samples, large firms 
and small firms.  
As can be seen from Panel A in the Table 4, the event day gets a positive and statistically 
significant value for all event windows. The announcement effects during the event windows 
Day 0, (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) are 0.22% (*), 0.42% (***) and 0.52% (***), respectively. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the reaction is, as expected, substantially smaller than found in 
earlier studies abroad and by Karhunen (2002) with the Finnish data. Karhunen detected for 
the same event windows cumulative abnormal returns of 0.67% (**), 1.86% (***) and 2.78% 
(***), respectively. The second study with Finnish data by Örmä (2008) finds CARs of 
similar magnitude as I found, namely 0.25%, 0.30% and 0.52%, respectively but not 
statistically different from zero. The CARs have become smaller most likely because 
investors are more conscious about the subject and more active as investors. Panel B shows 
the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of an initial actual repurchase. The 
market reactions are again slightly positive as in Panel A but not highly significant. The 
results related to actual repurchases during the event windows Day 0, (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) are 
0.36%. 0.52% (*) and 0.63%, respectively, which are very close to what detected by 
Karhunen (2002) 1.08% (***), 0.65% and 0.56%, respectively.  
39 
 
As already discussed, Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Chan 
et. al. (2004) argue, the event period returns are negatively related to firm size. This means 
that it is harder for small companies to communicate information to the market and more 
likely that there is information asymmetries but that these firms generate higher 
announcement period abnormal returns. This can be seen when analyzing the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the two sub-samples, large firms and small firms. As Table 4 reports, 
small firms generate substantially higher returns compared to large firms in both Panel A and 
Panel B. The market reaction surrounding the announcement of a repurchase program for 
small firms is close to threefold compared to large firms and highly statistically significant. In 
Panel B the difference between the sub-samples are material since small firms generate high 
positive CARs at significance level of at least 5%, whereas CARs of large firms are slightly 
negative for most event windows. All cumulative abnormal returns for the whole sample and 
for sub-samples are presented in the Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: 
Market Reaction around Share Repurchase Announcements 
This table reports the stock market reactions around the announcement of a share repurchase program and 
announcement of an initial actual share repurchase between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2008. The 
announcement date in Panel A and Panel B is the date when the announcement was initially made public. In 
both, Panel A and Panel B, the CARs are calculated for the whole sample and for the two sub-samples, large 
firms and small firms. The companies are divided into two sub-samples according to the median value of Market 
Capitalizations from the sample of all firms. The methodology used to calculate the CARs is presented in 
Chapter 4. 
 
 
Figure 1 describes the cumulative abnormal returns (-20, +20) around the share repurchase 
program announcements for the period from 1998 to 2008. Figure 1 plots CARs for the whole 
sample as well as for the two sub-samples. As mentioned earlier, share repurchase program 
announcements may be a consequence of bad share price performance (Comment and Jarrell, 
1991) and followed by a good share price performance with an effect even up to four years 
(Ikenberry et al., 1995). According to my analysis and calculations, I can not find evidence of 
bad share price performance before the announcement which is logical, because timing of the 
announcement does not have an important role in Finland since they are usually incorporated 
into the invitation to the annual general meeting. As can be seen from the Figure 1, all three 
Panel A: Announcement of a share repurchase program
Event window CAR t -value CAR t -value CAR t -value
Day 0 0.22 % 1.88 * 0.24 % 1.45 0.19 % 1.19
Days (-1,+1) 0.42 % 2.62 *** 0.33 % 1.46 0.52 % 2.27 **
Days (-2,+2) 0.52 % 2.73 *** 0.29 % 1.01 0.78 % 3.10 ***
Days (-10,+10) 1.21 % 3.71 *** 0.66 % 1.46 1.81 % 3.87 ***
Days (-20,+20) 2.15 % 4.61 *** 1.16 % 1.73 * 3.22 % 5.05 ***
Panel B: Announcement of an initial actual repurchase
Event window CAR t -value CAR t -value CAR t -value
Day 0 0.36 % 1.51 -0.25 % -1.51 * 1.35 % 2.47 **
Days (-1,+1) 0.52 % 1.70 * -0.20 % -0.69 1.68 % 2.75 ***
Days (-2,+2) 0.63 % 1.62 -0.10 % -0.23 1.82 % 2.56 **
Days (-10,+10) 1.24 % 1.81 * 0.32 % 0.41 2.73 % 2.20 **
Days (-20,+20) 0.41 % 0.46 -0.59 % -0.56 2.03 % 1.29
*,** and *** refer to the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
All firms Large firms Small firms
n = 131 n = 81 n = 50
n = 455 n = 228 n = 227
All firms Large firms Small firms
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lines for different samples are upward sloping which means that abnormal returns for the 
whole event window are mostly positive. 
 
Figure 1: 
Panel A: CARs for Repurchase Program Announcements 
This figure reports the stock market reactions around the announcement of a share repurchase program between 
January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2008. Daily abnormal returns are summed up over the period from 20 days 
before to 20 days after an announcement of a repurchase program. The announcement date is the date when the 
announcement of a share repurchase program was initially made public. The CARs are plotted for the whole 
sample (n = 455) and for the two sub-samples, large firms (n = 228) and small firms (n = 227). The companies 
are divided into two sub-samples according to the median value of Market Capitalizations from the sample of all 
firms. 
 
As described in the second chapter, the Finnish regulatory environment regarding share 
repurchases is very strict and requires a public announcement one week before the first actual 
share repurchase takes place. In recent years about half of the listed companies have received 
the authorization to buy own shares but the number of companies that make actual 
repurchases is only around 25% of the authorized firms. Since the number of firms that 
repurchase own shares is so small, it is suggested that announcement to buy own shares 
convey positive information to the market. As can be seen from Figure 2, the cumulative 
abnormal returns around initial actual repurchases are positive for the whole sample and for 
small firms but highly statistically significant only for small firms. Large firms generate 
negative CARs for all event windows except (-10, +10) days. This is most likely due to the 
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higher information asymmetries of small firms and when they announce to start actual 
repurchases the signal is strongly positive.  
 
Figure 2: 
Panel B: CARs for Initial Actual Share Repurchases 
This figure reports the stock market reactions around the announcement of an initial actual share repurchase 
between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2008. Daily abnormal returns are summed up over the period from 
20 days before to 20 days after an announcement to start actual repurchases. The announcement date is the date 
when the announcement of an initial actual repurchase was initially made public. The CARs are plotted for the 
whole sample (n = 131) and for the two sub-samples, large firms (n = 81) and small firms (n = 50). The 
companies are divided into two sub-samples according to the median value of Market Capitalizations from the 
sample of all firms (n = 455). 
 
 
6.2 Results on Regression Analysis Explaining the Market Reaction 
This sub-chapter analyzes the main determinants behind the observed event window returns. 
Previous studies about this subject have concentrated on understanding the market’s reactions 
to the announcements by the help of previously mentioned hypotheses. I approach the 
announcements of share repurchase programs in a similar way and try to find proof for the 
hypotheses in the Finnish market. The dependent variable in the regressions is the cumulative 
abnormal return between (-2, +2). The three regressions in Table 5 are run separately for all 
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initial share repurchase program announcements. In the following, I will go through the 
findings one hypothesis at a time. 
Results on the signaling hypothesis are mixed. As mentioned earlier, the signaling hypothesis 
predicts that returns preceding the announcement and the event window returns are negatively 
related. In this study, long-term pre-event cumulative abnormal return gets, in Regression 1 
and 2, positive coefficients and statistically significant values at 1% level. The sign is 
opposite what expected which indicates that the repurchase announcements are on average 
preceded by positive share price performance and treated by the market positively. This 
means that the relation between the two variables is not negative in the Finnish market. The 
short-term pre-event cumulative abnormal return gets the predicted sign but is not statistically 
significant. These findings support the fact that, in Finland, timing of share repurchase 
program do not have as important role as in some other countries, since the announcements 
are usually during the springtime at the Annual General Meetings. 
According Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Chan et. al. 
(2004), abnormal returns around the announcement day are negatively related to firm size. 
This means that it is harder for small companies to communicate information to the market 
and more likely that there is information asymmetries but that these firms generate higher 
announcement period abnormal returns. The natural logarithm of market capitalization 
explains the power of size and gets in Regressions 1 and 2 predicted signs for coefficients but 
without statistical significance. One reason for the weak relationship might be that firms that 
use repurchases in a way to distribute cash flows to shareholders are in general larger in size, 
and thus the information asymmetries are smaller.   
Market-to-Book equity ratio is a proxy for undervaluation and according to earlier studies it 
should receive a negative sign. The variable seems to have a negative relation with the event 
window cumulative abnormal returns and gets in Regressions 1 – 3 predicted negative signs 
with highly statistical significance. This indicates that value firms, low market-to-book value, 
have larger market reactions to repurchase announcements.   
Free cash flow hypothesis hypothesis suggests, as described earlier, that cash flow in excess 
of what is needed to daily operations should be distributed to shareholders. Li and McNally 
(2007) and Kahle (2002) find that the amount of free cash-flow is positively related to 
abnormal returns around repurchase announcements, whereas Grullon and Michaely (2004) 
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find the same reaction to the overall level of cash in the firm. In this study, the relationship 
between the free cash flow to total assets variable and cumulative abnormal returns is 
positive, as predicted, and in Regression 2 statistically significant at 10% level. This might 
indicate that companies with excess financial resources are more likely to make actual 
repurchases and distribute the financial slack to its owners. As the relation is not very strong, 
it can be interpreted that the positive market reaction is only weakly associated with reduced 
agency costs.  
Long-term debt to total assets measures the power of leverage hypothesis. The variable gets 
the predicted sign but is statistically insignificant. Foreign ownership is used to measure the 
tax reasons because foreign investors might benefit when company repurchases shares 
compared to dividends. The regression model indicates that tax reasons are not related to the 
observed cumulative abnormal returns since the coefficient is statistically insignificant. This 
evidence argues against the proposal that taxes would have significant role when considering 
share repurchases. Thus, my finding related to foreign ownership is contrary to Liljeblom and 
Pasternack (2006) whose results strongly indicate that higher foreign ownership is related to 
likelihood for share repurchases.  
The two dummies, “prior repurcase program” and “actual repurchases”, are included in the 
model to assess the companies’ share repurchase policy. “Prior repurchase program” variable 
is expected to receive negative sign; if a company has had earlier repurchase authorizations, it 
is most likely and expected that it will continue to apply new authorizations in future and thus 
the information shouldn’t surprise the market in a positive way anymore. On the other hand, 
“Actual repurchases” variable again should receive positive sign, because an announcement 
of starting actual repurchases is a strong signal to the market that the company is serious with 
its repurchase program and will make actual repurchases. However, as can be seen from Table 
5, the two abovementioned dummies get statistically insignificant coefficients and are thus 
not able to explain the positive event window returns. 
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Table 5: 
Determinants behind the Event Period Returns in the Total Sample 
The table presents results of three different regressions explaining the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding 
the event window (-2, +2) relative to the announcement date. The announcement date is the date when the 
repurchase program was initially made public. The sample includes 432 repurchase announcements by firms 
listed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2008 for which the required 
return data and accounting data is available. Regression 1 includes all variables when testing the relationships 
between variables and the event period cumulative abnormal returns. Regressions 2 and 3 focus on the two most 
common hypotheses explaining the observed returns in the previous literature. Statistical significance measured 
by t-test and the values are reported in the parentheses under the coefficients. 
 
Regression:
Dependent Variable:
Independet variables Predicted Sign
Constant 0.020 0.011 0.005
(2.181) ** (1.992) ** 1.499
"Signaling Hypothesis"
Pre-event CAR (-200-21) - 0.026 0.025
(3.300) *** (3.316) ***
Pre-event CAR (-20,-3) - -0.027
-(0.805)
LN of Market Capitalization - -0.001 -0.001
-(1.159) -(1.541)
Market-to-Book Equity Ratio - -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
-(2.058) ** -(2.545) ** -2.879 ***
"Free Cash Flow Hypothesis"
Free Cash Flow / Total Assets + 0.030 0.034 0.029
(1.410) (1.654) * 1.384
Cash and Equivalents / Total Assets + -0.022
-(1.300)
"Leverage Hypothesis"
Long Term Debt / Total Assets - -0.011
-(0.695)
"Dividend Substitution Hypothesis"
Foreign Ownership + -0.004
-(0.371)
"Dummies"
Prior Repurchase Program (1/0) - -0.004
-(0.943)
Actual Repurchases (1/0) + 0.003
(0.687)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.04 0.01
Observations 432 432 432
*,** and *** refer to the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
CAR (-2, +2)
1 2 3
46 
 
In order to compare the results between large and small companies, I have divided the total 
sample into two sub-samples again according to the median value of market capitalization. 
This gives the possibility to examine whether market behaves differently depending on the 
firm size. The findings for the variables measuring the power of signaling hypothesis are in 
line with the findings of the total sample, since the long-term pre-event cumulative abnormal 
return and market-to-book equity ratio get similar signs for the coefficients with highly 
statistically significant values. The difference to the total sample is that free cash flow to total 
assets in large firms gets the predicted sign in all regressions with statistically significant level 
of 5%. Also cash and equivalents variable captures statistically significant value at 10% level 
but the coefficient is not what expected. Interestingly, in Regression 1 focusing on large 
firms, the dummy variable prior repurchase programs gets the expected sign at 10% 
significance level which indicates that companies that have had earlier repurchase 
authorizations generate smaller cumulative abnormal returns than those having the first 
authorization. 
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Table 6: 
Determinants behind the Event Period Returns in the Two Sub-Samples 
The table presents results of three different regressions explaining the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding 
the event window (-2, +2) relative to the announcement date. The announcement date is the date when the 
repurchase program was initially made public. The two sub-samples include 216 repurchase announcements by 
large and small firms listed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2008 for 
which the required return data and accounting data is available. The total sample is divided into sub-samples 
according to the median value of market. Regression 1 includes all variables when testing the relationships 
between variables and the event period cumulative abnormal returns. Regressions 2 and 3 focus on the two most 
common hypotheses explaining the observed returns in the previous literature. Statistical significance measured 
by t-test and the values are reported in the parentheses under the coefficients. 
 
As can be seen from Tables 5 and Table 6, Regression 1 includes all variables when testing 
the relationships between variables and the event period cumulative abnormal returns. 
Regressions 2 and 3 focus on the two most common hypotheses explaining the observed 
returns in the previous literature. Regression 2 reports the relationships between signaling 
hypothesis, without short-term pre-event cumulative abnormal return, and free cash flow to 
total assets variable and get similar results as in Regression 1. The only difference in the total 
sample is that free cash flow hypothesis gets statistically significant coefficient at 10% level. 
Regression:
Dependent Variable:
Independet variables Predicted Sign
Constant 0.015 0.015 0.004 0.014 -0.006 0.020
(0.963) (1.010) (0.276) (1.246) -(1.079) (3.832) ***
"Signaling Hypothesis"
Pre-event CAR (-200-21) - 0.017 0.045 0.017 0.045
(1.724) * (2.964) *** (1.840) * (3.070) ***
Pre-event CAR (-20,-3) - -0.005 -0.022
-(0.105) -(0.491)
LN of Market Capitalization - -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
-(0.370) (0.288) -(0.795) (0.409)
Market-to-Book Equity Ratio - -0.001 -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.002 -0.007
-(1.705) * -(3.280) *** -(2.256) ** -(3.446) *** -(2.499) ** -(3.328) ***
"Free Cash Flow Hypothesis"
Free Cash Flow / Total Assets + 0.081 0.030 0.078 0.030 0.083 0.013
(2.183) ** (1.076) (2.272) ** (1.137) (2.412) ** (0.487)
Cash and Equivalents / Total Assets + -0.047 -0.008
-(1.807) * -(0.326)
"Leverage Hypothesis"
Long Term Debt / Total Assets - -0.013 -0.005
-(0.562) -(0.208)
"Dividend Substitution Hypothesis"
Foreign Ownership + -0.005 0.003
-(0.383) (0.158)
"Dummies"
Prior Repurchase Program (1/0) - -0.012 0.003
-(1.865) * (0.427)
Actual Repurchases (1/0) + 0.003 0.001
(0.506) (0.216)
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216
*,** and *** refer to the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Large Small Large Small Large Small
1 2 3
CAR (-2, +2)
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The regression 3 uses only Market-to-Book ratio and free cash flow to assets as explanatory 
variables and here free cash flow loses its statistical significance. In Table 6, the coefficients 
for small firms follow the same pattern as in Table 5 when changing the explanatory 
variables. The coefficients for large firms deviate only in respect of free cash flow where it 
gets a statistically significant value. 
As Table 5 and Table 6 report, the regressions are not able to explain the observed cumulative 
abnormal returns very well. The adjusted R-squares are quite low in all regressions with a 
value of less than 0.1. In the total sample only the long-term pre-event cumulative abnormal 
return and Market-to-Book equity ratio have significant power to explain the observed event 
period returns. When analyzing the two sub-samples, I find support also for the free cash flow 
hypothesis as the free cash flow to total assets gets a statistically significant value in the large 
firms sub-sample.  
All in all, findings of the multivariate regressions are quite similar to the ones detected by 
Örmä (2008). I have measured the pre-event cumulative abnormal return with two variables 
i.e. long-term and short-term CARs as described earlier whereas Örmä has tested the 
relationship with a variable from -50 days to day -1.  Short-term variable in this study and 
Örmä’s prior return variable receives coefficients with similar signs and magnitudes. The 
effect of long-term pre-event cumulative abnormal return in this study deviates notably from 
the effect found in previous studies, because I find statistically significant values but not with 
the predicted sign. Findings by Karhunen (2002) are also in line with my coefficients since he 
finds market-to-book ratio to be statistically significant. In addition, he finds some support for 
the variable of size and prior return with significant values which I was not able to detect. 
 
6.3 Liquidity Effects around Announcements 
In this sub-chapter, I test and measure the changes in liquidity by trading volume and turnover 
(trading volume / number of outstanding shares) as well as with bid-ask spreads. The 
methodology used to measure the liquidity changes around an announcement of share 
repurchase program and around an initial actual share repurchase was presented in chapter 4. 
Since the announcement of a share repurchase program generally contains other information 
as well, it is interesting to compare the findings of liquidity effects around the announcement 
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of an initial actual share repurchase, because the latter announcements are “clean” and do not 
contain other information.  
 
6.3.1 Changes in trading volume 
I analyze the trading volume surrounding the announcement of a share repurchase program as 
well as around the initial actual repurchase. In order to find out whether trading volume has 
increased or decreased, I have defined abnormal trading volume as the number of shares 
traded during day t divided by the average number of shares traded during -50 to -25 days 
before an event. I have calculated the trading volumes with two different data sets, one with 
the whole data and another with the data where events that are bigger than three times the 
standard deviation are removed so that the results are not driven by the outliers. A complete 
table of all results is presented in Appendix 2. I will discuss the two events, announcement of 
a program and initial share repurchase, separately since the results deviates from each other 
and the events are different by nature.  
The results of this study imply that, an announcement of a share repurchase program brings 
new information to the market and on average increases the trading volume. As can be seen 
from the Figure 3, the trading volume is rather close to the average before the announcement 
day but increases dramatically at the event day when on average, the trading volume is 1.82 
(2.63 with the initial sample) times the average trading volume and statistically different from 
one at 1% level. Although the finding for the trading volume during the event day is highly 
statistically significant, it is much smaller than detected by De Ridder and Råsbrant (2004) 
who found a trading volume 4.15 times the average volume. The trading volume continues to 
be exceptionally large until day +3 with statistically significant level at 1% and until day +4 at 
significance level of 5%. From day +5 on the daily trading volume converges to the average. 
Because the trading volume is around the average before the event day, it indicates that there 
is no information leakage to the outsiders and the announcement has an effect on trading 
activity. The results follow the same pattern also in the two sub-samples, large firms and 
small firms.  
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Figure 3: 
Trading Volume around the Announcement of a Repurchase Program 
This figure plots the trading volume around an announcement of a share repurchase program between January 1, 
1998 and December 31, 2008. Figure shows average trading volumes after removing events that are bigger than 
three times the standard deviation. The trading volume is defined as the number of shares traded during day t 
divided by the average number of shares traded during -50 to -25 days before the event day. The trading volumes 
are plotted for the whole sample (n = 459) and for the two sub-samples, large firms (n = 230) and small firms (n 
= 229).  
 
Also trading volumes around the initial actual share repurchase day reveal some interesting 
information. Trading volume for the total sample starts to be statistically different from one at 
1% level on day -1 and continues to be large till day +2. As Figure 4 illustrates, trading 
volume on day -1 is 1.75 times the average volume and decreases to 1.40 on the day of the 
announcement. It is interesting to notice, that less than half of the companies’ shares are 
traded above the average which shows that announcement of initial actual repurchases do not 
affect the trading volume especially in large firms. Because the exceptionally high trading 
volume starts one day before the event, it is most likely that some investors know in advance 
that company will start the actual repurchases. As mentioned earlier, the Finnish regulation 
requires companies to announce that they will start actual repurchases one week prior to the 
first repurchase. Interestingly, the trading volumes are relatively low and close to the average 
at the time when the first actual repurchases takes place (day +5). This indicates that the 
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announcement to start actual repurchases make investors more active regarding trading, but 
the actual repurchases do not result in higher trading volume. 
When analyzing findings in the two sub-samples, I find interesting information about trading 
volume when size effect is eliminated. Large companies’ trading volumes are on days -1 and 
0, 0.86 and 1.25 respectively, whereas small companies’ trading volumes during the same 
days are 2.06 and 2.08 respectively. Only one third of large companies trade above the 
average during those days, whereas the same percentages for small firms are 52% for both 
days. This provides proof that the announcement is not very interesting for shareholders in 
large firms but the information content, maybe due to information asymmetries, makes 
smaller companies’ shareholders more active in trading. As Figure 3 shows, trading volumes 
in large and small firms around share repurchase program announcements are quite close to 
each other. However, as can be seen from the Figure 4, trading volumes around initial actual 
repurchases of small companies are substantially higher compared to large companies.  
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Figure 4: 
Trading Volume around the Initial Actual Repurchase 
This figure plots the trading volume around an announcement of an initial actual repurchase between January 1, 
1998 and December 31, 2008. Figure shows average trading volumes after removing events that are bigger than 
three times the standard deviation. The trading volume is defined as the number of shares traded during day t 
divided by the average number of shares traded during -50 to -25 days before the event day. The trading volumes 
are plotted for the whole sample (n = 459) and for the two sub-samples, large firms (n = 230) and small firms (n 
= 229).  
 
 
6.3.2 Changes in turnover 
In addition to analyzing changes in trading volume, I have also measured liquidity by changes 
in turnover. The method used in the calculations is presented in chapter 4. I have calculated 
the turnovers around the announcement of a share repurchase program as well as when the 
initial actual repurchase takes place. The calculations of turnover are made with absolute 
values and with natural logarithms to overcome problems with skewness and kurtosis as done 
by Lo and Wang (2000). Figure 5 plots the turnover distributions with absolute values and 
with natural logarithmic values. As the results around the announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase do not get statistically significant values, I have left it out from the following 
analysis and concentrated on the announcements of a share repurchase program. A complete 
list of findings is presented in Appendix 3.  
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Figure 5: 
Turnover Distributions with Absolute and Logarithmic Values 
This figure illustrates the turnover distributions. The right-hand side presents the distribution of turnover (trading 
volume / number of outstanding shares) calculated as absolute values, whereas the left-hand side presents the 
distribution when natural logarithm is taken from the turnover. The natural logarithm is taken to overcome 
problems with skewness and kurtosis.  
 
 
Daily turnover compared to the average turnover as a value is very small by nature since the 
amount of shares traded during one day compared to the total number of shares outstanding is 
fractional. As can be seen from the Figure 6, the turnover for the total sample increases 
substantially on the event day and continues to be exceptionally high until day +2. The 
turnovers get statistically significant values at 1% level during these days. Results in the two 
sub-samples differ from each other greatly, since small companies do not get any statistically 
significant values whereas large companies get significant values at 5% level for the days -1 
and +3 and for the days 0 to +2 at 1% level. According to this method, the liquidity increases 
in large firms and the effect lasts until day +3 compared to what found when investigated 
trading volume, the announcement of a share repurchase program provided exceptional 
liquidity until day +4. Interestingly, changes in turnovers around the initial actual repurchases 
are very small and according to this method, the announcements do not increase liquidity.  In 
conclusion, it can be said that these two methods, trading volume and turnover, generated 
quite similar results about liquidity around repurchase program announcements.  
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Figure 6: 
Turnover around the Announcement of a Repurchase Program 
This figure plots the turnover around an announcement of a share repurchase program between January 1, 1998 
and December 31, 2008. The method how turnover is calculated is described in the fourth chapter. The turnovers 
are plotted for the whole sample (n = 459) and for the two sub-samples, large firms (n = 230) and small firms (n 
= 229).  
 
 
6.3.3 Changes in bid-ask spreads 
In previous studies, findings about changes in bid-ask spreads before and after share 
repurchase announcements and initial actual repurchases are mixed and do not provide 
conclusive evidence whether liquidity increase or decrease. I try to find proof for the two 
hypotheses that assume that liquidity remains the same before and after an event. The test is 
calculated as a relative bid-ask spread as shown in chapter 4. 
As can be seen from the Table 7, the event window used in the calculations is 20 days before 
and 20 days after an event. The shorter event windows 10 and 5 days before and after an event 
were also analyzed but not presented here, since the findings did not differ from the reported 
results. As done in previous tests as well, I have calculated the bid-ask spread for the total 
sample and for the two sub-samples, large and small firms, in order to test whether there are 
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any differences between more and less liquid firms. The division is done according to the 
median value of market capitalizations at the latest balance sheet date before an event.       
Table 6 concludes the findings of the relative spread surrounding an event. As can be seen, 
the changes in all samples’ relative spreads are small and not statistically significant before 
and after an event in both Panel A and Panel B. Thus, the hypothesis that share repurchases 
do not affect the liquidity of a firm’s share is not rejected. The spread is consistently 
substantially wider in small firms since they are not traded as frequently as larger firms’ 
shares. These findings are in line with the results reported by De Ridder and Råsbrant (2004) 
with the Swedish data. 
 
 
Table 7: 
Relative Spread Surrounding an Event 
This table shows the relative spreads around the announcement of a share repurchase program and 
announcement of an initial actual share repurchase between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2008. The 
announcement date in Panel A and Panel B is the date when the announcement was initially made public. In 
both, Panel A and Panel B, the relative spreads are calculated for the whole sample and for the two sub-samples, 
large firms and small firms. Companies are divided into two sub-samples according to the median value of 
Market Capitalizations from the sample of all firms. Table presents average relative spread 20 days before and 
20 days after an announcement of a share repurchase program as well as when the first repurchase takes place. 
The sample size in Panel A is 461 and in Panel B 131. The relative spread is defined as (Ask price - Bid price) / 
[(Ask price + Bid price) / 2] 
 
Panel A: Announcement of a share repurchase program
All Firms Large Firms Small Firms All Firms Large Firms Small Firms
Mean 2.03 % 0.86 % 3.20 % 1.98 % 0.84 % 3.11 %
Standard Deviation 0.0280 0.0093 0.0348 0.0275 0.0101 0.0339
n 461 231 230
Panel B: Announcement of an initial actual repurchase
Mean 2.11 % 1.00 % 3.75 % 2.11 % 0.92 % 3.87 %
Standard Deviation 0.0251 0.0145 0.0283 0.0245 0.0103 0.0286
n 131 78 53
Announcement of a share repurchase program
All Firms Not rejected
H0: Pre event spread = Post event spread Not rejected
Small Firms Not rejected
Announcement of an initial actual repurchase
All Firms Not rejected
H0: Pre event spread = Post event spread Not rejected
Small Firms Not rejected
Trading days -20 to -1 Trading days +1 to +20
Large Firms
t- Test
0.7752
0.8462
0.7864
Large Firms
0.9928
0.6687
0.8281
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6.3.4 Timing of initial actual share repurchase in relation to overall market performance 
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) studied whether companies can use superior information and 
conduct the actual repurchases in declining market on average. I have made a similar analysis 
for the whole sample as well as for two sub-samples, i.e. large firms and small firms, based on 
the median value of market capitalization. The method used in the analysis was described in 
chapter 4. 
To test whether companies use superior information in acquiring own shares for the first time 
in a declining market, I analyze the return against the return on the whole market as well as if 
an acquisition took place. The interaction variable T,SU captures the impact I am 
interested in. It measures the market sensitivity of the company’s returns on days when both 
the market is declining and the company is acquiring shares. I expect a negative sign, i.e. beta 
risk should be decreasing on the estimated coefficient β3 if acquiring firms trade in a way that 
is supporting their shares in downturns. 
As can be seen from Table 8, there is some timing effect since β3 coefficient gets the 
predicted sign in the entire sample as well as in large firms. It is still important to notice that 
the results are not statistically significant and thus, we can conclude that Finnish companies 
are, on average, not able to repurchase shares when the market is declining. 
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Table 8: 
Timing of Share Repurchases 
To test whether companies use superior information in acquiring own shares for the first time in a declining 
market, I analyze the return against the return on the whole market as well as if an acquisition took place. The 
dependent variable (Ri,t ) is the daily return on the repurchasing firm’s share. The independent variables are: (1) 
Daily value-weighted market return (Rm,t), (2) the overall return on the market with a dummy variable (γt) with a 
value of 1 if the market return is negative, zero otherwise, (3) the overall return on the market with two dummy 
variables (γt and δt) where the former takes a value of 1 if the overall return on the market is negative and 0 
otherwise and the latter dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the firm repurchased shares during the day and 0 
otherwise. The interaction variable T,SU  captures the impact we are interested in. It measures the market 
sensitivity of the company’s returns on days when both the market is declining and the company is acquiring 
shares. This regression analysis follows the method used by Grullon and Ikenberry (2000): 
 , =  * +  , + (,S +  T,SU +  V, 
 
 
 
  
α0 β1 β2 β3 N R2
Total Sample 0.001 0.757 -0.120 -0.108 461 0.066
(0.453) (3.754) *** -(0.312) -(0.296)
Large Firms -0.001 1.493 -0.362 -0.515 231 0.186
-(0.169) (5.200) *** -(0.661) -(0.976)
Small Firms 0.003 -0.152 0.315 0.237 230 0.006
(0.998) -(0.572) (0.623) (0.502)
*,** and *** refer to the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Share repurchases are a relatively new corporate activity in Finland as repurchases were 
allowed only at the end of 1997. The interest in the subject has increased substantially year by 
year and share repurchases are nowadays a common way of distributing excess cash to 
shareholders. This study examines the wealth and liquidity effects of share repurchases 
surrounding share repurchase announcements and initial actual repurchases. I study a sample 
of 466 open-market share repurchase programs by 93 companies and 133 initial actual 
repurchases by 58 companies. 
The research question of this study is twofold. First, I examine whether the announcements of 
share repurchase programs and the initial actual share repurchases have, on average, increased 
shareholder value in the Finnish stock market during 1998 – 2008. In accordance with the 
findings in earlier studies, my first and second hypotheses predict that such announcements 
generate positive cumulative abnormal returns for the company’s shareholders. In addition, 
key determinants that are expected to explain the observed CARs are investigated. Second, I 
study whether the share repurchase program announcements and initial actual repurchases 
have increased the liquidity or trading volume in the Finnish stock market during the same 
period. Based on the different arguments and results from the previous researches, I have 
formed third and fourth hypotheses that predict that the abovementioned announcements do 
not have an effect on liquidity or trading volume. 
The first research question is studied in Section 6.1. The section provides convincing support 
to the first hypothesis, as the average CARs are positive and highly significant over all studied 
event windows. The average CARs during event windows (-1,+1) and (-2,+2) are +0.42% and 
+0.52%, respectively and statistically significant at 1% level. These results support prior 
evidence that share repurchase announcements act as a positive signal to the market but 
findings are, as expected, substantially smaller than those detected in earlier studies abroad 
and by Karhunen (2002) with the Finnish data. However, it is important to point out that the 
CARs in the two sub-samples, large firms and small firms, deviates materially from each 
other. Large firms do not receive statistically significant values, whereas small firms get 
statistically significant values at 1% level during the abovementioned event windows totaling 
to +0.52% and +0.78%, respectively. 
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I also find some support for the second hypothesis as the cumulative abnormal returns, on 
average, surrounding announcements of initial actual repurchases received positive values in 
all event windows. The average CARs during event windows (-1,+1) and (-2,+2) are +0.52% 
and +0.63%, respectively, but only the first is statistically significant at 10% level. These 
finding are in line what found by Karhunen (2002). Large firms generate, on average, slightly 
negative CARs without any statistical significance, whereas the announcement effect in small 
firms is fairly large. The announcement effects in small firms are highly statistically 
significant and get values during event windows (-1,+1) and (-2,+2) 1.68% and 1.82%, 
respectively. 
The earlier literature introduces many motivations for a company to make share repurchases. 
The most popular motivations are signaling hypothesis and free cash flow hypothesis. 
Overall, the results from the regressions analysis suggest that commonly used variables to test 
various hypotheses and to explain the cumulative abnormal returns are not able to explain the 
announcement period returns very well in Finland. However, market-to-book and free cash 
flow / total assets variables get statistically significant values which gives some support for 
the signaling and free cash flow hypothesis. The statistically weak results in explaining the 
market reaction may be due to the small sample size or the fact that companies announce 
about repurchase programs every year at the same time and are not able to utilize the timing, 
as can be done in some other countries. 
The second research question is addressed in Section 6.3. I measure liquidity effects with 
three different methods: trading volume, turnover and bid-ask spreads. The section provides 
support that liquidity increases (hypotheses 3 and 4 are rejected) surrounding an 
announcement of a share repurchase program and around an initial actual repurchase. Trading 
volume is rather close to the average before the announcement of a share repurchase program 
but increases materially at the event day when the trading volume, on average, is 82% higher 
and statistically significant at 1% level. The trading volume continues to be exceptionally 
high until day +3 with statistically significant level at 1% and until day +4 at 5% significance 
level. The results follow the same pattern also in the two sub-samples, large firms and small 
firms. Since the trading volume is close to the average before the event day, it indicates that 
there is no information leakage to the outsiders and that the announcement has an effect on 
trading activity.  
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Trading volume around the initial actual repurchase starts to be statistically different from the 
average at 1% level on day -1 and continues to be large until day +2. As the trading volume 
starts to be exceptionally different from the average one day before the announcement, it is 
most likely that some investors know in advance that company will start actual repurchases. It 
is important to point out that trading volumes in the small firms are substantially higher 
compared to large firms. Interestingly, trading volumes are close to the average at the time 
when first actual repurchases takes place (day +5). According to the results, an announcement 
to start repurchases makes investors more active regarding trading but the actual repurchases 
do not affect trading volume. 
Turnover also provides support that liquidity increases after an announcement of a share 
repurchase program. The increase in turnover gets, on average, statistically significant values 
at 1% level between days 0 and +2. However, the results deviate greatly in the two sub-
samples as only large firms get statistically significant values. The analysis of turnover around 
initial actual repurchases is left out because no statistically significant results were found. In 
conclusion, it can be said that these two methods, trading volume and turnover, generate quite 
similar results around repurchase program announcements. 
A commonly used method testing liquidity effects is bid-ask spreads. I have calculated the 
bid-ask spreads for both events but these remain unchanged. Timing of actual share 
repurchases is also closely related to liquidity tests. According to the Finnish stock market 
data between 1998 – 2008, companies have some ability to time their first actual repurchases 
in a declining market but the results are not statistically significant. All in all, the results about 
liquidity indicate that share repurchase announcements and initial actual repurchases increases 
trading volume and liquidity in the Finnish stock market. Thus, according to the various tests 
in this study, I reject the third and fourth hypotheses and conclude that liquidity increases 
around the discussed events. 
Share repurchases as a topic offer many further research opportunities. Given the 
achievements of this study, a logical focus of future studies should be on the wealth and 
liquidity effects of daily repurchase transactions. Namely, it would be interesting to conduct 
an analysis about the timing of repurchases and to investigate if the companies follow some 
foreseeable patterns. Also a study whether companies follow the Finnish legislation as well as 
rules and regulations of the Helsinki Stock Exchange would be interesting.  
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APPENDIX 1  
All share repurchase program and initial actual repurchase announcements used in this study.  
64 
 
 
Company
Affecto OYJ 14.2.2008
14.2.2007
8.3.2006 30.5.2006
Ahlstrom OY 1.2.2008
2.2.2007
Aldata Solutions OYJ 11.3.2008
8.3.2007
14.3.2006
22.3.2005
Amanda Capital PLC 25.2.2008 30.9.2008
8.3.2007
22.2.2006
23.2.2005
22.1.2002
23.1.2001
Amer Sports Corporation 16.2.2007 23.8.2007
25.2.2005
16.2.2001
9.2.2000
11.2.1999
Aspo PLC 14.3.2008 3.9.2008
5.3.2007
13.3.2006
9.2.2005 6.6.2005
27.2.2004 17.5.2004
10.3.2003
25.3.2002
26.3.2001
Aspocomp Group PLC 28.2.2005
27.2.2004 17.12.2004
28.2.2003
15.2.2002 14.5.2002
19.2.2001 30.7.2001
Atria PLC 3.4.2008 2.10.2008
Basware OYJ 24.1.2008 4.11.2008
8.2.2007
29.1.2002
Beltton-Group PLC 13.3.2008
15.3.2007
16.3.2006
15.3.2005
18.3.2004
13.3.2003
8.3.2002
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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Company
Capman PLC 31.1.2008
2.2.2007
16.2.2006
2.3.2005
11.3.2004
6.3.2003
26.2.2002 27.8.2002
14.5.2001
Cargotec 'B' OYJ 17.1.2008 22.7.2008
17.1.2007
16.1.2006 14.6.2006
12.7.2005 26.10.2005
Componenta OYJ 30.1.2008
5.2.2007
20.1.2006
20.1.2005
22.1.2004
Comptel OYJ 13.2.2008
14.2.2007 21.2.2007
13.3.2006
8.2.2005
16.2.2004
14.2.2003
15.2.2002
5.3.2001
Cramo PLC 2.4.2008
17.3.2005
4.3.2004
13.3.2003
15.3.2002 2.9.2002
22.3.2001 31.8.2001
Done Solutions OYJ 13.3.2008 6.11.2008
14.3.2007
Efore PLC 9.1.2008
4.1.2006
14.2.2001
29.2.2000 24.8.2000
26.2.1998
Elcoteq SE 21.2.2007
3.3.2006
21.2.2001
Elecster OYJ 21.2.2008
29.3.2007
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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Company
Elektrobit Corporation 6.2.2008
15.2.2007
Elisa OYJ 12.2.2008 12.8.2008
8.2.2007 25.4.2007
3.3.2006 27.10.2006
10.2.2005
Etteplan OYJ 6.3.2008 22.7.2008
8.3.2007 2.11.2007
8.3.2006 27.10.2006
1.3.2005
10.3.2004
25.3.2003 22.5.2003
6.3.2002 23.5.2002
22.2.2001 19.9.2001
Exel PLC 13.3.2008
13.3.2007
8.3.2006
23.3.2005
19.3.2004
F-Secure OYJ 14.2.2008
Finnair OYJ 25.2.2008 6.2.2008
23.2.2007
28.2.2006
1.3.2005 1.9.2005
9.3.2004 1.7.2004
3.3.2003
Finnlines PLC 23.2.2005
23.2.2004 12.5.2004
24.2.2003
25.2.2002 25.10.2002
8.10.2001
Fiskars OYJ 13.2.2008
15.2.2007
14.2.2006
16.2.2005
6.2.2004
28.1.2003 9.12.2003
29.1.2002
1.2.2001
10.2.2000
1.2.1999
Fortum Corp. 30.1.2008
27.2.2007
2.2.2006 8.6.2006
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
67 
 
 
 
Company
Glaston Corporation 15.2.2007
23.2.2006
23.2.2005
24.2.2004
20.2.2003
28.2.2002
Hkscan Corporation 20.3.2008
21.3.2007 14.5.2007
24.3.2006
Honkarakenne OYJ 13.3.2008 15.5.2008
13.3.2007 30.3.2007
15.3.2006 7.9.2006
8.3.2005 29.9.2005
17.3.2004
21.3.2003 30.5.2003
Huhtamaki OYJ 25.2.2002 12.9.2002
13.2.2001 11.4.2001
Interavanti OYJ 29.1.2008
2.2.2007
24.3.1999
Ixonos PLC 12.3.2008
2.3.2007
16.2.2006
17.2.2005
11.3.2004
5.3.2003 23.4.2003
1.3.2002
22.3.2001 5.9.2001
7.9.2000
Julius Tallberg OYJ 24.2.1999
Kasola OYJ 19.3.2007
17.3.2006 8.11.2006
11.3.2005 5.1.2006
19.3.2004 12.8.2004
Kemira OYJ 6.2.2008
7.2.2006
8.2.2005
11.2.2002
12.2.2001
14.3.2000
19.2.1999
Keskisuomalainen OYJ 27.3.2008
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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Company
Kesla OYJ 6.2.2008
7.2.2007
15.2.2006
14.2.2005
9.2.2004
10.2.2003 3.11.2003
Kone Corp. 25.1.2008
26.1.2007
10.1.2006 15.5.2006
2.5.2005 5.9.2005
19.12.2003 29.3.2004
8.1.2002 3.6.2002
10.1.2001 27.3.2001
11.1.2000 17.3.2000
Konecranes PLC 8.2.2008
14.2.2007 8.11.2007
15.2.2006
11.2.2005
11.2.2004 29.10.2004
13.2.2003
15.2.2002 22.8.2002
19.2.1999 11.10.1999
17.2.1998
Lannen Tehtaat PLC 20.2.2008 19.5.2008
14.3.2001
7.3.2000 26.6.2000
2.3.1999 18.10.1999
3.3.1998 23.9.1998
Larox OYJ 1.3.2007
Martela OYJ 19.2.2008
14.2.2007
16.2.2006
16.2.2005
12.2.2004
25.2.2003
18.2.2002 29.5.2002
20.2.2001 14.11.2001
18.2.2000 20.12.2000
2.3.1999
10.3.1998
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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Company
Metso Corp. 6.2.2008
7.2.2007
8.2.2006
2.2.2005
4.2.2004
11.3.2003
7.2.2002
13.2.2001
16.2.2000
1.7.1999
Neomarkka PLC 8.5.2008
Nokia Corporation 24.1.2008 16.5.2008
25.1.2007 4.5.2007
26.1.2006 21.4.2006
27.1.2005 4.5.2005
22.1.2004 19.4.2004
23.1.2003 22.4.2003
24.1.2002
30.1.2001
1.2.2000
Norvestia PLC 7.2.2008
13.2.2007
8.2.2006
14.2.2005
11.2.2004
12.2.2003
Okmetic OYJ 7.10.2008
Olvi PLC 25.2.2008
1.3.2007 27.8.2007
23.2.2006 31.5.2006
8.3.2005
18.3.2004
9.3.2000
20.4.1998
Oriola-KD Corporation 20.2.2008
1.2.2007
Orion Corp. 7.2.2008
6.2.2007
14.2.2005
13.2.2004
18.2.2003
4.3.2002
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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Company
Outokumpu OYJ 31.1.2008
1.2.2007
2.2.2006
10.2.2005
10.2.2004
17.2.2003
21.2.2002
31.1.2001 9.4.2001
4.2.2000
Outotec OYJ 1.2.2008
5.2.2007
Panostaja OYJ 29.11.2007 4.11.2008
24.11.2006 5.7.2007
11.10.2005
15.1.2004 31.3.2004
16.1.2003 26.9.2003
Perlos Corp. 2.3.2007
3.3.2006
3.3.2005
19.3.2002 8.11.2002
Ponsse OYJ 9.4.2008
16.3.2007
Poyry PLC 1.2.2008
2.2.2007
3.2.2006
3.2.2005
10.2.2004
7.2.2003 20.3.2003
8.2.2002 30.9.2002
13.2.2001 23.8.2001
11.2.2000
19.2.1999
QPR Software PLC 13.2.2008
14.2.2007 11.5.2007
18.6.2002
Raisio PLC 12.2.2007 10.4.2007
16.2.2005 10.8.2005
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
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Company
Ramirent PLC 18.2.2008
26.2.2007
22.2.2006
10.3.2005
23.3.2004
7.4.2003
5.4.2002
30.3.2001
28.3.2000
24.3.1999
Rapala VMC Corp. 13.3.2008 6.5.2008
15.3.2007
Rautaruukki Corp. 6.2.2008
7.2.2007
8.2.2006
17.2.2005
Raute PLC 10.3.2008
26.2.2007
20.2.2006
14.2.2005
Rocla OYJ 3.3.2008
15.3.2007
16.3.2006
10.3.2005
1.3.2004
14.2.2003
18.2.2002
16.2.2001
29.5.2000 13.7.2000
Ruukki Group OYJ 11.3.2008 5.11.2008
6.4.2006
19.5.2005
6.5.2004
Salcomp PLC 7.3.2008
Sanoma-Wsoy Corp. 7.2.2008
8.2.2007
4.3.2005
20.2.2004
Satama Interactive PLC 26.2.2008
28.2.2007
6.3.2006 15.8.2006
7.3.2005 6.5.2005
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company
Scanfil PLC 13.3.2008
13.3.2007
2.3.2006 4.9.2006
17.3.2005 1.6.2005
Solteq OYJ 27.2.2008 3.7.2008
27.2.2007 11.3.2008
1.3.2006
25.2.2005
4.3.2004
7.3.2003
7.3.2002
9.3.2001
16.3.2000
Soprano OYJ 2.4.2008
5.4.2007 10.3.2008
26.4.2006
15.3.2005
Sponda PLC 28.2.2008
15.3.2007
28.2.2006
1.3.2005
17.3.2004
18.3.2003
1.3.2002 25.6.2002
SRV Group PLC 17.3.2008 9.6.2008
Stora Enso OYJ 2.2.2006
3.2.2005 30.3.2005
4.2.2004 31.3.2004
30.1.2003 27.3.2003
30.1.2002 24.5.2002
7.2.2001 28.3.2001
10.2.2000 14.9.2000
Stromsdal OYJ 6.4.2004
24.4.2003
Suomen Helasto OYJ 28.11.2006
30.11.2005
21.1.2004
22.1.2003
23.1.2002
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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Company
Suominen Corporation OYJ 11.2.2008
12.2.2007
15.2.2006 3.11.2006
16.2.2005
6.2.2004
5.2.2003
6.2.2002 25.9.2002
Sysopendigia PLC 18.2.2008 29.10.2008
8.2.2007
2.3.2004
Talentum OYJ 12.2.2008 28.3.2008
23.2.2007
2.3.2006
2.3.2005
3.3.2004
12.2.2003
26.2.2002
15.2.2001
14.3.2000
11.3.1999 26.5.1999
Technopolis PLC 28.2.2008
8.3.2007
Tecnomen Corp. 13.2.2008
14.2.2007
14.2.2006
27.2.2004
14.2.2003
Tekla OYJ 25.2.2008
16.2.2007
27.2.2006
Teleste OYJ 4.3.2008
14.3.2007
3.3.2006
7.3.2005
13.2.2004
13.3.2003
8.3.2002 15.5.2002
1.3.2001 27.6.2001
21.3.2000
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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Company
Tietoenator OYJ 6.2.2008
6.2.2007 1.8.2007
9.2.2006 4.5.2006
11.2.2005 1.9.2005
12.2.2004 29.9.2004
14.2.2003
14.2.2002
15.2.2001 2.10.2001
Tulikivi OYJ 6.2.2008
21.3.2007
7.2.2006
7.2.2005
5.2.2004
28.2.2003
UPM-Kymmene Corp. 5.2.2008
12.2.2007 29.8.2007
31.1.2006
1.2.2005 28.4.2005
29.1.2004 9.2.2005
30.1.2003
5.2.2002
21.2.2001 29.3.2001
16.5.2000 21.6.2000
12.2.1999 31.8.1999
Uponor OYJ 7.2.2008
14.2.2007
9.2.2006
9.2.2005 29.3.2005
3.2.2004 16.12.2004
12.2.2003 26.3.2003
5.2.2002 12.6.2002
8.2.2001 24.4.2001
Vacon PLC 29.2.2008 31.10.2008
28.3.2007
10.3.2006
4.3.2005
3.3.2004 27.12.2004
28.2.2003
7.3.2002
Vaisala Corp. 31.1.2005 27.2.2006
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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Company
Wartsila Corp. 7.2.2006
3.2.2005
6.2.2003
7.2.2002
15.2.2001
16.2.2000
YIT Corp. 15.2.2005 16.12.2005
Yleiselektroniikka OYJ 18.2.2008
20.2.2007
21.2.2006 29.11.2006
22.2.2005
3.3.2004
4.3.2003
5.3.2002
TOTAL 466 133
Announcement of a share 
repurchase program
Announcement of an initial actual 
share repurchase
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APPENDIX 2 
This table reports the Abnormal Trading Volume (ATV) around the announcement of a share repurchase 
program and around the initial actual share repurchase. The abnormal trading volume is defined as the number of 
shares traded during day t divided by the average number of shares traded during -50 to -25 days before the 
event day. Statistical significance is measured by t-Test where symbols *** and ** refer to the levels 1% and 5% 
respectively. Null hypothesis implies that mean should be one (= average trading volume). 
 
  
Panel A: Announcement of a share repurchase program n = 459
Total Sample
Day -20 -15 -10 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +10 +15 +20
Mean 0,96 1,01 1,28 1,20 1,21 1,49 1,30 1,43 2,63 2,16 1,84 1,53 1,41 1,53 1,94 1,60 1,52
% > 1 34 % 34 % 36 % 36 % 37 % 34 % 35 % 36 % 50 % 45 % 43 % 42 % 37 % 37 % 37 % 38 % 37 %
t-Test -0,70 0,14 1,91 2,62 2,52 2,77 2,67 1,95 6,65 3,65 4,53 3,47 3,11 3,09 2,19 4,05 4,35
*** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** ***
Large Firms (n = 230)
Mean 0,93 1,05 1,34 1,25 1,25 1,48 1,05 1,22 2,81 1,66 1,53 1,51 1,37 1,38 1,26 1,63 1,58
% > 1 35 % 36 % 40 % 39 % 43 % 36 % 40 % 42 % 61 % 49 % 48 % 47 % 42 % 40 % 39 % 42 % 45 %
t-Test -1,19 0,64 1,68 2,61 2,39 1,69 0,68 2,45 5,36 4,64 3,43 2,11 2,19 1,52 2,44 2,81 4,04
*** ** ** *** *** *** ** ** ** *** ***
Small Firms (n = 229)
Mean 0,99 0,96 1,22 1,14 1,17 1,50 1,55 1,64 2,46 2,65 2,15 1,55 1,45 1,69 2,62 1,58 1,47
% > 1 32 % 31 % 32 % 34 % 31 % 32 % 29 % 30 % 39 % 41 % 38 % 37 % 33 % 35 % 35 % 34 % 30 %
t-Test -0,09 -0,47 1,03 1,22 1,32 2,37 2,60 1,47 4,08 2,68 3,41 2,93 2,22 2,88 1,90 2,94 2,41
** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** **
Total Sample Removed events that are bigger than 3 times standard deviation
Mean 0,96 1,01 1,03 1,17 1,15 1,10 1,13 1,12 1,82 1,48 1,30 1,28 1,15 1,07 1,13 1,29 1,33
% > 1 34 % 34 % 35 % 36 % 36 % 33 % 34 % 35 % 47 % 43 % 41 % 41 % 36 % 36 % 34 % 36 % 36 %
t-Test -0,70 0,14 0,57 2,39 2,04 1,38 1,65 1,84 7,68 5,39 3,87 3,89 2,19 1,09 1,80 3,31 3,71
** ** *** *** *** *** ** *** ***
Large Firms (n = 230)
Mean 0,93 0,97 1,06 1,25 1,12 1,01 1,01 1,16 1,86 1,44 1,27 1,28 1,12 1,04 1,13 1,14 1,29
% > 1 35 % 35 % 38 % 39 % 42 % 34 % 40 % 42 % 56 % 47 % 47 % 47 % 41 % 39 % 37 % 39 % 42 %
t-Test -1,19 -0,54 0,86 2,61 1,47 0,11 0,17 2,21 6,91 4,48 3,13 3,35 1,54 0,59 1,56 1,77 3,09
*** ** *** *** *** *** ***
Small Firms (n = 229)
Mean 0,99 0,96 1,03 1,14 1,17 1,29 1,21 1,14 1,46 1,39 1,32 1,35 1,14 1,10 1,18 1,28 1,28
% > 1 32 % 31 % 31 % 34 % 31 % 31 % 27 % 29 % 35 % 38 % 35 % 36 % 32 % 32 % 32 % 32 % 29 %
t-Test -0,09 -0,47 0,27 1,22 1,32 1,93 1,51 1,13 3,09 2,90 2,37 2,64 1,27 0,91 1,32 1,98 1,88
*** *** ** *** **
Panel B: Announcement of an initial actual repurchase, n = 132
Total Sample
Day -20 -15 -10 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +10 +15 +20
Mean 0,96 0,97 1,25 1,74 1,19 1,25 1,17 1,75 2,11 2,63 2,22 1,03 1,78 2,26 1,53 1,33 1,38
% > 1 34 % 31 % 33 % 36 % 34 % 33 % 39 % 45 % 48 % 42 % 41 % 36 % 36 % 39 % 38 % 37 % 35 %
t-Test -0,48 -0,25 1,53 1,57 0,82 1,46 1,17 2,95 2,65 2,58 2,65 0,35 1,64 1,79 2,10 1,69 2,01
*** *** ** *** ** **
Large Firms (n = 78)
Mean 0,95 0,94 1,23 1,36 0,97 1,21 1,13 1,53 1,25 1,76 1,13 0,91 0,86 1,88 1,25 1,11 1,21
% > 1 36 % 31 % 36 % 33 % 31 % 28 % 35 % 40 % 44 % 38 % 40 % 29 % 24 % 37 % 31 % 40 % 35 %
t-Test -0,40 -0,55 1,04 1,32 -0,23 0,95 0,58 1,84 1,94 1,95 1,02 -1,02 -1,60 0,95 0,97 0,76 0,90
Small Firms (n = 54)
Mean 0,96 1,01 1,27 2,29 1,50 1,31 1,24 2,06 3,35 3,88 3,80 1,21 3,12 2,82 1,94 1,65 1,64
% > 1 31 % 31 % 30 % 39 % 39 % 39 % 46 % 52 % 56 % 46 % 44 % 48 % 54 % 44 % 50 % 35 % 37 %
t-Test -0,27 0,06 1,16 1,19 0,95 1,11 1,34 2,31 2,38 2,02 2,59 1,11 1,85 1,66 1,93 1,51 2,00
** ** ** **
Total Sample Removed events that are bigger than 3 times standard deviation
Mean 0,96 0,97 1,25 1,30 0,97 1,25 1,17 1,75 1,40 1,48 1,33 1,03 1,04 1,12 1,34 1,32 1,37
% > 1 34 % 31 % 33 % 35 % 33 % 33 % 39 % 45 % 46 % 39 % 37 % 36 % 33 % 36 % 36 % 36 % 34 %
t-Test -0,48 -0,25 1,53 1,57 -0,29 1,46 1,17 2,95 2,82 2,57 2,04 0,35 0,38 1,03 1,83 1,64 1,97
*** *** ** **
Large Firms (n = 78)
Mean 0,85 0,94 0,85 1,03 0,89 0,85 0,92 0,86 1,25 0,87 1,13 0,91 0,86 0,94 1,01 1,01 0,91
% > 1 35 % 31 % 32 % 31 % 29 % 24 % 33 % 33 % 44 % 31 % 38 % 28 % 23 % 35 % 28 % 37 % 31 %
t-Test -2,06 -0,55 -1,67 0,23 -1,04 -1,42 -0,95 -1,56 1,94 -1,41 1,02 -1,02 -1,60 -0,70 0,07 0,06 -0,83
**
Small Firms (n = 54)
Mean 0,96 1,01 1,27 1,21 1,50 1,31 1,24 2,06 2,08 1,95 2,46 1,21 2,09 1,79 1,90 1,61 1,61
% > 1 31 % 31 % 30 % 37 % 39 % 39 % 46 % 52 % 52 % 43 % 39 % 46 % 50 % 41 % 48 % 33 % 35 %
t-Test -0,27 0,06 1,16 0,83 0,95 1,11 1,34 2,31 2,07 1,97 2,26 1,11 1,92 1,72 1,89 1,46 1,93
** ** **
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APPENDIX 3 
This table reports the Turnover around the announcement of a share repurchase program and around the initial 
actual share repurchase. The calculation method of Turnover is presented in chapter 4. Statistical significance is 
measured by t-Test where symbols *** and ** refer to the levels 1% and 5% respectively. Null hypothesis 
implies that mean should be zero. 
 
Panel A: Announcement of a share repurchase program n = 459
Total Sample Calculated with logarithmic terms
Day -20 -15 -10 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +10 +15 +20
Mean -0,03 % 0,02 % 0,04 % -0,01 % -0,01 % 0,05 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,26 % 0,12 % 0,07 % 0,02 % -0,02 % -0,02 % 0,08 % 0,01 % 0,03 %
% > 0 30 % 33 % 34 % 34 % 35 % 32 % 33 % 35 % 48 % 42 % 41 % 41 % 36 % 36 % 35 % 36 % 36 %
t-Test -2,02 0,72 1,20 -0,38 -0,61 1,19 -0,10 0,60 6,30 3,88 2,59 1,09 -0,84 -1,08 1,01 0,23 1,00
** *** *** ***
Large Firms (n = 230)
Mean -0,01 % 0,08 % 0,12 % 0,04 % 0,04 % 0,07 % 0,02 % 0,06 % 0,44 % 0,20 % 0,10 % 0,07 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,03 % 0,06 % 0,07 %
% > 0 33 % 36 % 40 % 36 % 43 % 36 % 38 % 42 % 60 % 47 % 47 % 48 % 40 % 39 % 37 % 42 % 45 %
t-Test -0,25 1,33 1,95 1,31 1,53 1,29 0,76 2,37 6,80 5,21 3,16 2,40 0,15 0,33 1,15 1,68 2,44
** *** *** *** ** **
Small Firms (n = 229)
Mean -0,06 % -0,03 % -0,04 % -0,06 % -0,06 % 0,02 % -0,03 % -0,04 % 0,08 % 0,04 % 0,04 % -0,02 % -0,03 % -0,05 % 0,13 % -0,05 % -0,02 %
% > 0 28 % 29 % 29 % 31 % 27 % 28 % 28 % 28 % 36 % 37 % 35 % 34 % 32 % 33 % 33 % 30 % 28 %
t-Test -2,40 -1,32 -1,49 -2,20 -2,24 0,40 -0,84 -1,24 1,65 0,81 0,92 -0,62 -1,13 -1,77 0,83 -1,81 -0,40
** ** **
Total Sample Carculated with absolute values
Mean -0,02 % 0,03 % 0,05 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,06 % 0,01 % 0,02 % 0,27 % 0,13 % 0,08 % 0,03 % -0,01 % -0,01 % 0,09 % 0,01 % 0,04 %
% > 0 34 % 33 % 36 % 36 % 37 % 34 % 34 % 36 % 50 % 45 % 42 % 41 % 37 % 37 % 36 % 37 % 37 %
t-Test -1,83 1,02 1,46 0,02 -0,18 1,45 0,29 1,06 6,67 4,45 3,20 1,64 -0,44 -0,74 1,12 0,65 1,39
*** *** ***
Large Firms (n = 230)
Mean -0,01 % 0,08 % 0,12 % 0,04 % 0,04 % 0,07 % 0,02 % 0,06 % 0,44 % 0,20 % 0,10 % 0,07 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,03 % 0,06 % 0,07 %
% > 0 35 % 36 % 40 % 39 % 43 % 36 % 40 % 42 % 61 % 48 % 47 % 47 % 42 % 39 % 38 % 42 % 44 %
t-Test -0,29 1,34 1,93 1,23 1,40 1,26 0,70 2,24 6,71 5,21 3,02 2,28 0,10 0,29 1,06 1,61 2,33
** *** *** *** ** **
Small Firms (n = 229)
Mean -0,04 % -0,01 % -0,02 % -0,04 % -0,04 % 0,04 % -0,01 % -0,02 % 0,10 % 0,06 % 0,06 % 0,00 % -0,02 % -0,03 % 0,15 % -0,03 % 0,00 %
% > 0 32 % 31 % 32 % 34 % 31 % 32 % 28 % 30 % 39 % 41 % 38 % 36 % 33 % 35 % 34 % 33 % 29 %
t-Test -2,58 -0,60 -0,80 -2,34 -2,40 0,78 -0,38 -0,77 2,22 1,34 1,59 -0,09 -0,73 -1,61 0,95 -1,67 -0,01
** ** ** **
Panel B: Announcement of an initial actual repurchase, n = 132
Total Sample Calculated with logarithmic terms
Day -20 -15 -10 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +10 +15 +20
Mean -0,02 % 0,02 % 0,02 % 0,06 % -0,01 % 0,01 % 0,04 % 0,10 % 0,08 % 0,13 % 0,03 % -0,04 % -0,02 % 0,02 % -0,03 % 0,01 % -0,01 %
% > 0 30 % 26 % 32 % 34 % 35 % 32 % 39 % 41 % 47 % 40 % 40 % 33 % 33 % 39 % 39 % 31 % 35 %
t-Test -1,00 0,50 0,61 1,41 -0,27 0,31 0,82 1,74 1,82 1,79 0,96 -1,98 -0,79 0,51 -1,42 0,33 -0,33
**
Large Firms (n = 78)
Mean -0,01 % 0,06 % 0,04 % 0,08 % -0,01 % 0,02 % 0,07 % 0,16 % 0,05 % 0,14 % -0,03 % -0,05 % -0,06 % 0,01 % -0,07 % 0,03 % -0,03 %
% > 0 33 % 28 % 36 % 33 % 32 % 28 % 36 % 36 % 44 % 36 % 37 % 29 % 24 % 38 % 32 % 35 % 35 %
t-Test -0,17 0,81 0,78 1,17 -0,25 0,44 0,86 1,72 0,99 1,17 -0,90 -1,37 -1,86 0,23 -2,23 0,53 -0,64
**
Small Firms (n = 54)
Mean -0,04 % -0,03 % -0,01 % 0,03 % 0,00 % -0,01 % 0,00 % 0,01 % 0,12 % 0,13 % 0,13 % -0,03 % 0,03 % 0,03 % 0,02 % -0,02 % 0,02 %
% > 0 26 % 22 % 26 % 35 % 39 % 37 % 43 % 48 % 52 % 46 % 44 % 37 % 44 % 39 % 48 % 26 % 35 %
t-Test -3,15 -1,86 -0,47 0,87 -0,09 -0,29 -0,07 0,32 1,56 1,82 1,91 -2,33 0,82 0,61 0,63 -0,65 0,47
*** **
Total Sample Carculated with absolute values
Mean -0,02 % 0,03 % 0,02 % 0,07 % 0,00 % 0,02 % 0,04 % 0,10 % 0,08 % 0,14 % 0,04 % -0,04 % -0,02 % 0,02 % -0,03 % 0,02 % 0,00 %
% > 0 34 % 31 % 33 % 36 % 34 % 32 % 39 % 44 % 49 % 42 % 41 % 35 % 36 % 39 % 37 % 36 % 34 %
t-Test -0,76 0,61 0,78 1,54 -0,09 0,47 0,93 1,83 1,95 1,85 1,09 -1,77 -0,59 0,68 -1,17 0,48 -0,13
Large Firms (n = 78)
Mean -0,01 % 0,06 % 0,04 % 0,08 % -0,01 % 0,02 % 0,07 % 0,16 % 0,05 % 0,14 % -0,03 % -0,05 % -0,06 % 0,01 % -0,07 % 0,03 % -0,03 %
% > 0 36 % 31 % 36 % 33 % 31 % 27 % 35 % 38 % 45 % 38 % 40 % 28 % 26 % 37 % 31 % 37 % 33 %
t-Test -0,19 0,79 0,78 1,17 -0,27 0,43 0,86 1,71 0,98 1,17 -0,92 -1,41 -1,88 0,22 -2,24 0,53 -0,65
**
Small Firms (n = 54)
Mean -0,03 % -0,02 % 0,00 % 0,05 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,02 % 0,13 % 0,14 % 0,14 % -0,02 % 0,05 % 0,04 % 0,03 % 0,00 % 0,03 %
% > 0 31 % 31 % 30 % 39 % 39 % 39 % 46 % 52 % 56 % 46 % 43 % 44 % 52 % 43 % 46 % 33 % 35 %
t-Test -2,28 -1,12 0,13 1,19 0,36 0,17 0,43 1,15 1,75 1,99 2,08 -1,45 1,15 0,95 1,06 -0,09 0,89
** **
